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[L]egal abstraction, while never socially neutral, always remains socially 
volatile.  Without constant reference to changing social dynamics and 
consequences, students of procedure [including judges] can scarcely 
know what they are talking about.
1
 
Edward A. Purcell, Jr. 
 
In Memory of Ben Kaplan 
INTRODUCTION 
Few subjects in the field of Procedure are characterized by greater 
legal abstraction than the collection of doctrines that govern the rela-
tionship between the federal and state courts.  The grand experiment 
by which the drafters of the Constitution “split the atom of sovereign-
ty,”2 as Justice Kennedy memorably put it, has not always produced rea-
dily administrable doctrines for the actual business of running parallel 
and overlapping judicial systems.  The Court’s efforts to harmonize the 
operation of those systems through the Erie doctrine and its interpreta-
tions of the Rules Enabling Act3—the statute that both authorizes and 
limits the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure—have been most successful 
when undertaken with an informed awareness of social dynamics and 
consequences.4  But successful harmonization of the judicial systems has 
been the exception, not the rule. 
Two related problems under the Enabling Act cry out for prag-
matism informed by both knowledge of history and realism about con-
temporary conditions, but have languished for decades without proper 
resolution.  The first involves a broad interpretive question:  how can 
the limitations on rulemaking authority contained in the Act be ap-
plied in a manner that reflects the separation-of-powers concerns that 
 
1 EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., BRANDEIS AND THE PROGRESSIVE CONSTITUTION 257 
(2000). 
2 U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 838 (1995) (Kennedy, J., 
concurring). 
3 28 U.S.C. §§ 2072–2077 (2006). 
4 See, e.g., Guar. Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 101-12 (1945) (identifying the ju-
risdictional policies that inform the Erie doctrine’s nonconstitutional dimensions and 
clarifying the role that those policies play in limiting a diversity court’s power to craft 
judge-made procedure); PURCELL, supra note 1, at 141-45, 149-55, 246-55 (discussing 
Justice Brandeis’s deep concern, which contributed to his opinion in Erie and is re-
flected in Guaranty Trust, about the waste and unfairness that corporate defendants 
created by jurisdictional manipulation designed to wear out their opponents and to 
take advantage of general federal common law).  
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animated them5 while also exhibiting respect for the state regulatory 
arrangements that govern much of our economic and social activity?  
The Supreme Court has not yet provided a useful answer to that ques-
tion.  Instead, it has often relied on a rigid formalism that creates per-
verse incentives, leading the Court to give some Federal Rules implaus-
ibly broad interpretations in order to apply federal law while emptying 
others of content in order to avoid an Enabling Act challenge. 
The second problem involves the intersection of the Enabling Act 
with class action practice:  following the 1966 amendments to Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 23 and the ascendance of the class action to a 
position of central importance in the enforcement of many regulatory 
policies, how can Rule 23 be squared with any reasonable account of 
the Enabling Act’s prohibition against rules that abridge, enlarge, or 
modify substantive rights?6  The prospect of class certification is the 
single most important factor in the dynamics of litigation or settle-
ment in any proceeding in which class treatment is on the table.  Cert-
ification can transform unenforceable negative-value claims into an  
industry-changing event and dramatically alter the litigation or settle-
ment value of high-stakes individual claims.  After almost half a century 
of doctrinal development under modern Rule 23, the possibility that 
the entire endeavor may have unfolded in violation of the Enabling 
Act seems increasingly compelling, but the disruptive consequences of 
such a conclusion would be unacceptable. 
Shady Grove Orthopedic Associates v. Allstate Insurance Co.,7 a closely 
watched case decided in the 2009–10 Term, presented the Supreme 
Court of the United States with an opportunity to speak to both issues.  
Shady Grove was a federal diversity case involving a potential conflict 
between a provision of New York law that prohibits the award of pen-
alties or statutory damages on a classwide basis unless expressly author-
ized,8 and Federal Rule 23, which broadly authorizes federal courts to 
 
5 See Stephen B. Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1015, 
1106-12 (1982) (arguing that the Rules Enabling Act’s procedure/substance dicho-
tomy was not designed primarily to safeguard state law, but rather to limit the prospec-
tive lawmaking power the Act granted to the Supreme Court and thereby maintain the 
separation of powers). 
6 See 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (stating that procedural rules “shall not abridge, enlarge 
or modify any substantive right”). 
7 130 S. Ct. 1431 (2010). 
8 See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 901(b) (McKinney 2006) (“Unless a statute . . . specifically au-
thorizes the recovery [of a penalty or statutory damages] in a class action, an action to 
recover a penalty, or minimum measure of recovery created or imposed by statute may 
not be maintained as a class action.”). 
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certify, manage, and hear class action proceedings.9  Sadly, the case 
shed little light.  In a fractured opinion written for a divided Court, 
Justice Scalia held that Rule 23 displaced New York’s law on the issue 
of classwide penalty liability.  In the portion of his opinion that spoke 
for a majority, Justice Scalia offered an interpretation of Rule 23 that 
found a conflict with New York law where none need exist.10  And 
when speaking for a plurality, he provided an account of federal and 
state policies on aggregate litigation that ignored the practical realities 
of the modern class action and the animating impulses behind it, an ac-
count that more accurately reflects class action practice in 1938 than in 
2010.11  There are some valid insights in the plurality opinion dealing 
with the proper interpretive approach to the Enabling Act, but they are 
eclipsed by oversimplification and overwhelmed by the tide of confu-
sion that characterizes the rest of the opinion.  Shady Grove called for a 
restrained and enlightened interpretation of both the Enabling Act and 
Rule 23, but the Justices did not deliver. 
This Article seeks to redeem the missed opportunities of Shady 
Grove and provide the clarifying accounts of the Enabling Act and 
Rule 23 that the opinions fail to offer.  After a brief overview of the 
Shady Grove dispute in Part I, Part II addresses the proper interpretive 
approach to the Rules Enabling Act.  Building upon past work,12 we 
identify the need for a more dynamic approach to the text of Federal 
Rules than the Court has exhibited—one that recognizes the inde-
terminacy inherent in prospective rulemaking, the role of federal 
common law in the interpretation of the Rules, and the role of the 
Rules in federal common law—and the need to revisit the line be-
tween “procedure” and “substance” in light of practical experience 
and evolving legal norms. 
 
9 See FED. R. CIV. P. 23. 
10 See Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1437-42 (determining that Rule 23 was in conflict with 
section 901(b) and thus that, if valid, Rule 23 must govern in federal diversity suits). 
11 See id. at 1442-44 (Scalia, J., for himself, Roberts, C.J., Thomas, J., and Soto-
mayor, J.) (explaining that Rule 23 “merely enables a federal court to adjudicate claims 
of multiple parties at once . . . [and that] like traditional joinder, it leaves the parties’ 
legal rights and duties intact and the rules of decision unchanged”). 
12 See, e.g., Stephen B. Burbank, Hold the Corks:  A Comment on Paul Carrington’s 
“Substance” and “Procedure” in the Rules Enabling Act, 1989 DUKE L.J. 1012 [hereinafter 
Burbank, Hold the Corks]; Stephen B. Burbank, Interjurisdictional Preclusion, Full Faith 
and Credit and Federal Common Law:  A General Approach, 71 CORNELL L. REV. 733 (1986) 
[hereinafter Burbank, Interjurisdictional Preclusion]; Stephen B. Burbank, Of Rules and 
Discretion:  The Supreme Court, Federal Rules and Common Law, 63 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
693 (1988) [hereinafter Burbank, Rules and Discretion]; Burbank, supra note 5. 
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Part III then turns to the status of class action litigation under the 
Enabling Act.  We regard Shady Grove as the occasion for a shift in un-
derstanding of the sources and content of aggregation policy.  Al-
though some may view the reorientation we propose as radical, it has 
deep roots in the history of the class action and its treatment under 
Rule 23, and it is consistent with much existing class action practice.  
The solution to the seeming dilemma caused by Rule 23’s dramatic 
impact upon substantive liability and regulatory regimes is that 
Rule 23 is not the source of the aggregate-liability policies that gener-
ate that impact, and it never has been.  Rather, courts must look to 
the substantive liability and regulatory regimes of state and federal law 
in determining whether aggregate relief is appropriate and consistent 
with the goals of that underlying law.  Rule 23 is merely the mechanism 
for carrying an aggregate proceeding into effect when the underlying 
law supports that result.  It is an important mechanism, and one that 
makes its own controlling policy choices for the federal courts about 
such matters as notice, opportunity to opt out, and immediate appeal of 
certification.  But Rule 23 does not set policy on the propriety of aggre-
gate remedies as a means of accomplishing regulatory goals—and it 
could not possibly do so.13  In the dispute that produced Shady Grove, 
section 901(b) of the New York Civil Practice Law and Rules set liability 
policy under New York law.  The Court did violence to the Enabling Act 
when it concluded that Rule 23 could supersede that policy. 
I. THE SHADY GROVE DISPUTE 
Shady Grove arose out of a dispute between Allstate Insurance and 
Shady Grove Orthopedic concerning payments due under a no-fault 
 
13 Justice Powell foreshadowed some aspects of our analysis in his incisive dissent 
in the Roper case: 
The Court argues that the result will be to deny compensation to putative class 
members and jeopardize the enforcement of certain legal rights by “private [at-
torneys] general.”  The practical argument is not without force.  But predicating 
a judgment on these concerns amounts to judicial policymaking with respect to 
the adequacy of compensation and enforcement available for particular substan-
tive claims.  Such a judgment ordinarily is best left to Congress.  At the very least, 
the result should be consistent with the substantive law giving rise to the claim.  
Today, however, the Court never pauses to consider the law of usury.  Since Mis-
sissippi law condemns the aggregation of usury claims, the Court’s concern for 
compensation of putative class members in this case is at best misplaced and at 
worst inconsistent with the command of the Rules Enabling Act. 
Deposit Guar. Nat’l Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 354-55 (1980) (Powell, J., dissenting) 
(footnotes and citations omitted). 
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insurance scheme.14  Shady Grove had provided medical treatment to 
an injured individual who was covered by no-fault automobile insur-
ance as required by New York law.15  After the individual assigned all 
her payment rights to Shady Grove, the company sought reimburse-
ment directly from Allstate.16  Allstate eventually paid, but not within 
the thirty-day period that was required for uncontested claims.17  New 
York law imposes two percent monthly interest on late payments under 
the no-fault insurance scheme, a penalty that totaled around five hun-
dred dollars in this instance.18 
On the basis of this claim, Shady Grove became the named plaintiff 
in a putative class action filed against Allstate in federal court under the 
Class Action Fairness Act of 2005.19  The suit alleged that Allstate regu-
larly failed to make uncontested payments within the required thirty-
day period, and that even after rendering payment for covered services 
it consistently failed to pay the two-percent monthly penalty required 
under New York law,20 or otherwise acted in bad faith in seeking to 
avoid that penalty.21  Plaintiff sought certification of a class to prosecute 
these claims on behalf of all insurance beneficiaries or their assignees 
whose rights Allstate had allegedly violated in this fashion.22 
New York law includes a provision specifically addressing the 
availability of statutory-penalty or minimum-damage remedies in a 
class proceeding, which was enacted when New York updated its gen-
eral class action provision following the 1966 amendments to Federal 
Rule 23.23  In section 901(a) of the New York Civil Practice Law and 
Rules, New York adopted general requirements for certification of a 
class action that broadly parallel the requirements of its federal coun-
terpart.24  Section 901(b) further specified as follows:  “Unless a statute 
creating or imposing a penalty, or a minimum measure of recovery 
 
14 See Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1436 (majority opinion). 
15 Id. 
16 Id. 
17 Id. 
18 Id. at 1436-37; see also N.Y. INS. LAW § 5106(a) (McKinney 2009) (“All overdue 
payments shall bear interest at the rate of two percent per month.”). 
19 See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d) (2006).  
20 Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1436-37. 
21 Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 466 F. Supp. 2d 467, 475-76 
(E.D.N.Y. 2006).  
22 See Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1436-37. 
23 See Stephen B. Burbank, The Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 in Historical Context:  
A Preliminary View, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1439, 1549 (2008) (illustrating through an ap-
pendix state adoptions of Rule 23 as amended in 1966).   
24 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 901(a) (McKinney 2006). 
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specifically authorizes the recovery thereof in a class action, an action 
to recover a penalty, or minimum measure of recovery created or im-
posed by statute may not be maintained as a class action.”25  Section 
901(b) thus creates a default rule against the availability of classwide sta-
tutory penalties under New York law, requiring express authorization if 
classwide relief is to be available.  Since the New York no-fault insurance 
laws do not include such authorization, section 901(b) prohibits the 
award of the two-percent late-payment penalty on a classwide basis. 
Shady Grove presented the question whether a federal court sitting 
in diversity should apply section 901(b) and deny the classwide remedy 
as a state court would.  The district court and the Second Circuit both 
concluded that section 901(b) was indeed binding upon the federal 
courts and that Federal Rule 23 did not purport to displace that provi-
sion,26 a conclusion that earlier district court opinions had shared al-
most uniformly.27  But the Supreme Court disagreed. 
Speaking for a majority on this point only, Justice Scalia held that 
Rule 23 and section 901(b) unavoidably collide.28  Rule 23(a), he 
pointed out, “states that ‘[a] class action may be maintained’ if two 
conditions are met:  The suit must satisfy the criteria set forth in sub-
division (a) . . . and it also must fit into one of the three categories de-
scribed in subdivision (b).”29  Concluding that the Rule “creates a  
categorical rule entitling a plaintiff whose suit meets the specified crite-
ria to pursue his claim as a class action,”30 the majority found that this 
 
25 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 901(b) (McKinney 2006). 
26 See Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 466 F. Supp. 2d 467, 
471-73 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) (holding that section 901(b) barred a class action in this case), 
aff’d, 549 F.3d 137, 145 (2d Cir. 2008).  
27 See, e.g., Leider v. Ralfe, 387 F. Supp. 2d 283, 289-90 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (holding 
that there was “no collision” between Rule 23 and section 901(b) because Rule 23 
merely establishes procedure for pursuing class actions, while section 901(b) prohibits 
that mechanism for certain types of litigation); Ansoumana v. Gristede’s Operating 
Corp., 201 F.R.D 81, 88 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (noting that any plaintiffs wanting to preserve 
their right to recover liquidated damages would have to opt out of the class because of 
section 901(b)); Dornberger v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 182 F.R.D. 72, 84 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) 
(certifying a class under Rule 23 but severing a claim that arose under a statute provid-
ing for a specific penalty, holding that “[w]hereas this Court is bound by Fed.R.Civ.P. 
23 in this action, the strictures of New York’s CPLR § 901(b) do not contravene any 
federal rule”).  But see Wesley v. John Mullins & Sons, Inc., 444 F. Supp. 117, 119-20 
(E.D.N.Y. 1978) (assuming in dictum that statutory penalties would be recoverable in a 
class action but dismissing the state law claim on other grounds). 
28 Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431, 1438-42 
(2010). 
29 Id. at 1437 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 23). 
30 Id. 
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supposed mandate conflicted with New York law, which uses bewitch-
ingly parallel language in specifying that, except when specifically  
authorized, “an action to recover a penalty, or minimum measure of re-
covery created or imposed by statute may not be maintained as a class  
action.”31 
This conclusion necessitated an analysis of Rule 23’s validity under 
the Enabling Act.  Following the Court’s precedents, the “direct colli-
sion” between the two provisions required the application of the Fed-
eral Rule unless that result would violate the Act’s limitations on inter-
ference with substantive rights (or the Constitution).32  Speaking for a 
plurality of four, Justice Scalia found it “obvious that rules allowing 
multiple claims (and claims by or against multiple parties) to be liti-
gated together” are valid under the Enabling Act, since joinder rules 
“neither change plaintiffs’ separate entitlements to relief nor abridge 
defendants’ rights; they alter only how the claims are processed.”33  Any 
impact that the availability of classwide relief might have on the levels 
at which a penalty provision can be enforced, including the danger of 
overenforcement—as one New York commentary put it, the threat of 
“‘annihilating punishment’”34—was, in the plurality’s view, merely an 
“‘incidental effect[]’” that did not call into question the validity of 
Rule 23 or the propriety of the majority’s broad reading of that rule.35 
Justice Stevens concurred separately, providing the fifth vote for 
the majority’s Rule 23 holding but rejecting the plurality’s strong  
embrace of Sibbach v. Wilson & Co.36 in explaining that result under 
the Enabling Act.37  Justice Ginsburg authored a four-Justice dissent 
that, among other things, offered a different account of the proper 
 
31 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 901(b) (McKinney 2006) (emphasis added); see also Shady Grove, 
130 S. Ct. at 1438-39 (emphasizing the parallel language in the two provisions). 
32 See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 471 (1965) (“[T]he court has been instructed 
to apply the Federal Rule, and can refuse to do so only if the Advisory Committee, this 
Court, and Congress erred in their prima facie judgment that the Rule in question 
transgresses neither the terms of the Enabling Act nor constitutional restrictions.”).  
33 Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1443 (Scalia, J., for himself, Roberts, C.J., Thomas, J., 
and Sotomayor, J.). 
34 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 901, cmt. C901:11 (quoting Ratner v. Chem. Bank of N.Y., 54 
F.R.D. 412, 416 (S.D.N.Y. 1972)). 
35 See Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1444. 
36 312 U.S. 1 (1941). 
37 See Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1448-49 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concur-
ring in the judgment). 
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interpretive approach to Rule 23,38 one with which Justice Stevens 
agreed in some respects.39 
When the dust settled at the end of the opinions, little was  
resolved.  The proper interpretive approach to the Enabling Act re-
mains an open question.  We take up that question in the next Part.  
Only the Court’s interpretation of Rule 23—at once sweeping in scope 
and utterly barren in its account of the Rule’s practical impact on the 
regulation of economic and social activity—had the backing of a ma-
jority.  And, as we explain in Part III, the majority’s analysis was so  
divorced from reality that Shady Grove will likely stand for little more 
than the bare holding that Rule 23 does not on its face violate the 
Enabling Act.  With that proposition, at least, we can agree. 
II. SHADY GROVE AND THE RULES ENABLING ACT: 
MISSING THE FOREST AND THE TREES40 
Although we have chosen to treat in separate sections Shady 
Grove’s Enabling Act analysis and the interpretation of the Federal 
Rules, the two are linked; courts have responded to the inadequacies 
of doctrine in the former domain by exercising restraint in the latter.  
These inadequacies include the Court’s persistent failure, starting 
with Sibbach, to acknowledge separation of powers as the primary pur-
pose of the Enabling Act’s allocation of lawmaking power.  Although 
perhaps initially stimulated by the desire to augment its rulemaking 
power, the Court’s erroneous invocation of federalism as the animat-
ing goal of the Enabling Act’s procedure/substance dichotomy ensnared 
the Federal Rules in the confused jurisprudence that followed Erie 
Railroad Co. v. Tompkins,41 providing one incentive for restrained in-
terpretation.  The Court eventually cleaned up part of the mess with 
Hanna v. Plumer42 by making clear that the allocation of lawmaking 
 
38 See id. at 1465-69 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
39 See id. at 1456-57 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judg-
ment) (discussing Justice Ginsburg’s dissent). 
40 We have employed this metaphor in the past: 
 In more than one part of the opinion in Ortiz, as in Amchem, the Court ex-
pressed solicitude for the limitations on court rulemaking imposed by the 
Rules Enabling Act.  Consistently with its previous misreadings of that statute, 
however, the Court missed the forest of separation of powers for the trees of 
federalism. 
Stephen B. Burbank, The Class Action in American Securities Regulation, 4 ZEITSCHRIFT 
FÜR ZIVILPROZEß INTERNATIONAL 321, 335 (1999) (footnotes omitted). 
41 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
42 380 U.S. 460 (1965). 
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power between the federal government and the States depends on the 
source of federal lawmaking power.  Even so, the Court did nothing to 
call into question Sibbach’s misdirected and wooden approach to the 
Enabling Act, thus providing a different incentive for restrained in-
terpretation of the Federal Rules. 
Whether prompted by concern about consistency with prevailing 
Erie jurisprudence or by implicit acknowledgment that Sibbach is 
hopeless, the Court’s jurisprudence interpreting Federal Rules, al-
though often restrained, has rarely been enlightened.  That is not a 
surprise, since enlightened interpretation must be informed by at-
tention to purpose, and the Court has never been willing to focus on 
the Act’s purpose to safeguard the separation of powers—the respec-
tive policy spheres of Congress as lawmaker and the Supreme Court 
in its dual role as rulemaker and expositor of federal common law—
let alone to grapple with the implications of that focus for the inter-
pretive enterprise. 
Our discussion of Shady Grove’s Enabling Act analysis requires that 
we review the course of the Court’s jurisprudence interpreting that 
statute.  Doing so lays bare the tensions that have flowed from the  
erroneous choice, at the start, to privilege federalism over separation 
of powers, and the attendant consequences that have flowed from the 
Court’s attempts to avoid undesirable consequences through re-
strained interpretation of Federal Rules—attempts undertaken with-
out a coherent interpretive framework.  An enlightened and re-
strained interpretation, we argue, requires attention to the actual policy 
choices that Federal Rules make and that Congress had an opportunity 
to review, and if necessary reject.  By this route, the federal courts would 
honor the Enabling Act’s purpose to affirm the separation of powers 
through a limited delegation of prospective lawmaking power, along 
with the process for congressional review of proposed Federal Rules 
that has been part of the statute since the beginning.  It would also 
honor Hanna’s federalism purpose to distinguish between sources of 
federal lawmaking power when considering state law prerogatives. 
Our approach may reduce the domain of some Federal Rules,  
because it calls for careful attention to the role of federal common law 
as a necessary supplement to the Rules’ open-ended text in identifying 
the source and content of litigation policies in the federal courts.  
Sometimes, federal common law will be required to implement feder-
al interests reflected in valid federal law, including the Rules them-
selves.  Where this is so, state law will be displaced.  Sometimes, how-
ever, the federal common law analysis will fail to unearth interests that 
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are demonstrably rooted in existing federal law.  In the latter class of 
cases, the limitations on federal common law in diversity litigation will 
often require that state law control the analysis because no valid fed-
eral interests requiring protection exist to displace it.  This interpre-
tive approach should change the perverse incentive structure that has 
contributed to the chaotic state of current law. 
A.  False Start 
It is easy to forget that Sibbach v. Wilson & Co.43—the 1941 decision 
in which the Court first entertained a challenge to a Federal Rule un-
der the Enabling Act—was, on that question, a 5-4 decision.  It is even 
easier to forget—or even to overlook—that although the Court attri-
buted the procedure/substance dichotomy in the first two sentences 
of the Act to concerns about the allocation of lawmaking power be-
tween the federal government and the States,44 Justice Frankfurter’s 
opinion for the four Justices in the minority discerned correctly that 
the animating concern of the Act was separation of powers. 
As Frankfurter pointed out, the Enabling Act authorizes prospec-
tive supervisory court rules for all civil actions in federal district 
court,45 including cases governed by federal substantive law in which 
any concern about the allocation of lawmaking power relates exclu-
sively to “national law.”46  If concerns about federalism drove the 
Enabling Act’s allocation scheme, either its standards would have to 
do double duty—implementing limitations in federal question cases 
that were not informed by the relevant structural considerations—or 
the Act would impose no restrictions on prospective supervisory court 
rulemaking with respect to federal substantive rights.  Neither option 
is analytically coherent.  The separation-of-powers account is further 
 
43 312 U.S. 1 (1941). 
44 See id. at 9-10 (contrasting Congress’s power to regulate “procedure of federal 
courts” with its lack of authority to declare or abolish “substantive state law”); Burbank, 
supra note 5, at 1029-30 n.60 (“The link between the constitutional and statutory allo-
cation of federal and state power and the scope of the delegation in the Rules Enabl-
ing Act is made clear in the paragraph [in Sibbach] following that suggesting limits on 
congressional power . . . .”). 
45 See Sibbach, 312 U.S. at 19 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (“But Rule 35 applies to 
all civil litigation in the federal courts, and thus concerns the enforcement of federal 
rights and not merely of state law in the federal courts.”). 
46 See id. at 18 (“So far as national law is concerned, a drastic change in public poli-
cy in a matter deeply touching the sensibilities of people or even their prejudices as to 
privacy, ought not to be inferred from a general authorization to formulate rules for the 
more uniform and effective dispatch of business on the civil side of the federal courts.”). 
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strengthened by the fact that the Enabling Act became law in 1934, 
four years before Erie put an end to the infringements on state law-
making prerogatives under the general federal common law that Swift 
v. Tyson authorized.47  Moreover, in 1934, federal question cases dom-
inated the civil docket of the federal courts.48  The view that separa-
tion-of-powers concerns were the impetus for the Enabling Act’s limi-
tations on rulemaking becomes well-nigh impregnable when one also 
considers that, although the 1934 legislative history of the Enabling 
Act is both very short and not at all illuminating on this or any other 
question of consequence, the separation-of-powers account is con-
firmed in the detailed and very illuminating legislative history of court 
rulemaking bills that the Senate considered in the 1920s, including 
committee reports on a bill that, with the exception of one word, was 
identical to the statute enacted in 1934.49 
We do not know why the Sibbach Court ignored such powerful evi-
dence that separation of powers, rather than federalism, animated the 
Enabling Act’s limitations on rulemaking by the Supreme Court.  Per-
haps it was the influence of Erie, which was decided the same year the 
Federal Rules became effective and three years before Sibbach, and 
 
47
 Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), overruling Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. 
(16 Pet.) 1 (1842). 
48 See AM. LAW INST., A STUDY OF THE BUSINESS OF THE FEDERAL COURTS pt. 2, at 
53-57 (1934) (providing detailed statistics on the number of diversity and federal ques-
tion cases that were terminated in federal district courts between June 1929 and June 
1930); DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED 
STATES FOR THE FISCAL YEAR 1936, exhibit 2, at 162, 177-79 (displaying the assortment 
and number of federal question cases that were tried in district courts in fiscal year 
1936); Stephen B. Burbank, Vanishing Trials and Summary Judgment in Federal Civil Cases:  
Drifting Toward Bethlehem or Gomorrah?, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 591, 619 (2004) 
(explaining that the original Advisory Committee for the Federal Rules was aware that 
the “litigation landscape” was not “dominated by simple diversity cases”); cf. Burbank, 
supra note 5, at 1109-10 (discussing the lack of concern for preservation of state law 
when the Rules Enabling Act was formulated and passed). 
49 See Burbank, supra note 5, at 1050-98.  The research that explored this legisla-
tive history also unearthed a 1923 letter from the author of the relevant section of the 
bill, Senator Albert Cummins, to Chief Justice Taft in which Cummins requested that 
Taft “particularly note the sentence reading:  ‘Said rules shall neither abridge, en-
large, nor modify the substantive rights of any litigant.’”  Letter from Sen. Albert B. 
Cummins to Hon. William H. Taft, reprinted in Burbank, supra note 5, at 1073 n.260.  
Cummins continued, 
I hope you will not think that I overlooked the obvious principle that Con-
gress could not if it wanted to, confer upon the Supreme Court, legislative 
power.  I have suggested this sentence solely to quiet the apprehensions of 
those who may be opposed to any measure of this sort. 
Id. 
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which became a “brooding omnipresence”50 that for years assumed 
extraconstitutional influence.  That does not seem a wholly satisfacto-
ry explanation, however, given that the relevant legislative history had 
been brought to the Court’s attention51 and that four Justices grasped 
the inadequacy of the federalism account.  Moreover, since the limita-
tions, correctly understood, protect against inappropriate prospective 
federal lawmaking by the Supreme Court, they also serve to protect 
state interests (albeit in a derivative fashion) by preserving for Con-
gress, and hence to legislators representing the States, the decision 
whether to enact prospective federal law on matters that exceed those 
limitations.  If Congress chooses not to make federal law, then state 
law governs unless displaced by valid federal common law. 
More likely, the majority in Sibbach believed that linking the 
Enabling Act’s allocation scheme to federalism constraints with re-
spect to substantive law—constraints that, under Erie, the Constitution 
was thought to impose on Congress and that the Rules of Decision 
Act52 does impose on the federal courts53—would maximize the 
Court’s rulemaking power and ensure the integrity of the recently 
promulgated Federal Rules.  More generally, the federal judiciary 
would be able to regulate the broad landscape that the Sibbach majori-
ty’s author had advocated as appropriate for judicial control before he 
joined the Court,54 rather than the narrower landscape that reformers 
in New York had advocated in work on which proponents of the 
 
50 S. Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 222 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (“The 
common law is not a brooding omnipresence in the sky but the articulate voice of 
some sovereign . . . .”); Charles E. Clark, State Law in the Federal Courts:  The Brooding 
Omnipresence of Erie v. Tompkins, 55 YALE L.J. 267 (1946).  For evidence of the “imme-
diate impact of Erie in muddying the waters,” see Burbank, supra note 5, at 1110-11 n.435.  
51 See Burbank, supra note 5, at 1180 (noting that Mrs. Sibbach’s attorney “drew 
the Court’s attention to the support for her functional argument, and some of its im-
plementing abstractions, in . . . the 1926 Senate Report”). 
52 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (2006). 
53 See Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1941); sources cited supra note 44 
(describing the Court’s linking of the Act to principles of federalism). 
54 See Owen J. Roberts, Trial Procedure—Past, Present and Future, 15 A.B.A. J. 667, 668 
(1929) (arguing that the regulation of procedure should not be left in the care of the 
legislature but rather should “be in the hands of those who know best about it and 
who . . . can make rules to meet situations as they arise in the actual practice of law”), 
quoted in Burbank, supra note 5, at 1031 n.65; see also Sibbach, 312 U.S. at 14 (“[T]he new 
policy envisaged in the enabling act of 1934 was that the whole field of court procedure 
be regulated in the interest of speedy, fair and exact determination of the truth.”). 
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Enabling Act relied at various points in its long pre-1934 legislative 
history, including in a key Senate Judiciary Committee Report.55 
On this view, a federalism account facilitated the monolithic for-
malism that suffuses the Court’s opinion in Sibbach, painting a land-
scape in which there is only procedure and substantive law, with noth-
ing in between.56  Whether or not this move reflected the jurispruden-
tial beliefs of the majority,57 it was a useful tool to reach a desired re-
sult.  The plurality opinion in Shady Grove illustrates that the tool still 
has its uses, even in the hands of Justices who are conversant with the 
lessons of legal realism and the significant changes in thought con-
cerning the relationship between procedure and substantive law—in 
particular, the growing awareness that in “procedure” lurks power to 
alter or mask substantive results—that have occurred in the ensuing 
seventy years.  That is reason enough to regret the plurality opinion.  
It becomes cause for remonstrance when one realizes that these Jus-
tices manifested awareness of the shortcomings of Sibbach’s interpreta-
tion of the Enabling Act58 but chose neither to repudiate that inter-
 
55 See Burbank, supra note 5, at 1055-61, 1087-88, 1125-27 (discussing the limita-
tions on court rulemaking emphasized by the New York Reports and the extent to 
which House and Senate committees relied on them prior to 1934).  That those pri-
marily responsible for explaining the bills that preceded the Enabling Act drew heavily 
on these New York sources is additional evidence that federalism was not their primary 
concern.  It also imparts an additional layer of irony to the decision in Shady Grove. 
56  See id. at 1028-31. 
The references by the Court to “rights conferred by law to be protected and 
enforced in accordance with the adjective law of judicial procedure” and to 
procedure as “the judicial process for enforcing rights and duties recognized 
by substantive law” strongly suggested that the Rules Enabling Act divided the 
legal universe into two parts:  rules of decision found within areas, such as 
contracts, tort, and property, that would be deemed purely substantive by any-
one’s definition, and all other rules, which would be considered procedural, 
even if they had some effect on the enforcement of pure substantive rules. 
Ralph U. Whitten, Erie and the Federal Rules:  A Review and Reappraisal After Burlington 
Northern Railroad v. Woods, 21 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1, 6-7 (1987). 
57 Justice Roberts was joined by Chief Justice Hughes and Justices McReynolds, 
Stone, and Reed.  See Sibbach, 312 U.S. at 6, 19.  For recent work challenging the tradi-
tional account of judicial behavior that sees a clear divide between formalism and real-
ism, see BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, BEYOND THE FORMALIST-REALIST DIVIDE:  THE ROLE OF 
POLITICS IN JUDGING (2010). 
58  Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431, 1445-46 
(2010) (citations omitted) (Scalia, J., for himself, Roberts, C.J., and Thomas, J.). 
 In reality, the concurrence seeks not to apply Sibbach, but to overrule it (or, 
what is the same, to rewrite it).  [Sibbach’s] approach, the concurrence insists, 
gives short shrift to the statutory text forbidding the Federal Rules from “ab-
ridg[ing], enlarg[ing], or modify[ing] any substantive right.”  There is some-
thing to that.  It is possible to understand how it can be determined whether a 
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pretation nor to use other tools that the Court had previously, albeit 
inconsistently, employed to minimize the damage. 
B.  Damage Control:  From Too Little to Too Much Power in the Federal Rules 
Prior to Shady Grove the Court minimized the damage of Sibbach’s 
wooden and, at least in its federalism orientation, demonstrably erro-
neous interpretation of the Enabling Act primarily by interpreting 
Federal Rules not to govern the matter in issue.  In the beginning, 
that approach was straightforward and unexceptionable, as in Palmer 
v. Hoffman, where the Court clearly and correctly held that Rule 8(c) 
governs only the burden of pleading and does not speak to the burden 
of persuasion.59  As time passed, the approach was less straightforward 
and, as a result, more easily contested.  For example, in the Ragan case, 
the Court seemed to abjure interpreting Rule 3 to specify a rule for toll-
ing a state statute of limitations because of concern that Erie forbade 
that result.60  As a result of Ragan and some other cases, the baggage of 
Erie’s “brooding omnipresence,” which Sibbach carried, seemed to 
threaten the integrity of the Federal Rules.61  That threat prompted the 
Court’s unsuccessful attempt to clarify the relationship between federal 
and state law in Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Electrical Cooperative, Inc.,62 fol-
lowed by its renewed, more successful attempt in Hanna.63 
 
Federal Rule “enlarges” substantive rights without consulting State law:  If the 
Rule creates a substantive right, even one that duplicates some state-created 
rights, it establishes a new federal right.  But it is hard to understand how it can 
be determined whether a Federal Rule “abridges” or “modifies” substantive 
rights without knowing what state-created rights would obtain if the Federal 
Rule did not exist.  Sibbach’s exclusive focus on the challenged Federal Rule—
driven by the very real concern that Federal Rules which vary from State to 
State would be chaos—is hard to square with § 2072(b)’s terms. 
Id. 
59 318 U.S. 109, 117 (1943) (“Rule 8(c) covers only the manner of pleading.  The 
question of the burden of establishing contributory negligence is a question of local law 
which federal courts in diversity of citizenship cases must apply.” (citation omitted)). 
60 See Ragan v. Merchs. Transfer & Warehouse Co., 337 U.S. 530, 533-34 (1949) 
(“We cannot give [this suit] longer life in the federal court than it would have had in 
the state court without adding something to the cause of action.”); Whitten, supra note 
56, at 9-10 (“One cannot read the Ragan opinion without drawing the conclusion that 
the Court viewed the case as one in which a Federal Rule conflicted with state law, and 
in which Erie thus required application of the state provision.” (footnote omitted)). 
61 See Burbank, supra note 5, at 1032 (stating that cases interpreting the Rules in 
relation to Erie “raised fears for the integrity of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure” 
(footnote omitted)).  
62 See 356 U.S. 525, 534-40 (1958) (explaining that because the state rule was not 
“intended to be bound up with the definition of the rights and obligations of the par-
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As Professor Ely acknowledged in his exegetical mea culpa on 
Hanna, by relying on Sibbach the Court again failed to clarify whether 
and how the Enabling Act’s limitations on the Court’s power to 
promulgate prospective supervisory court rules differ from the Consti-
tution’s limitations on Congress.64  That failure may help to explain 
why, in his much-noted concurring opinion, Justice Harlan elided the 
limitations of the Constitution and the Enabling Act.  While expressing 
admiration for the Court’s attempt to prevent the frustration of valid 
federal law under the cloud of the Court’s prior Erie jurisprudence, Jus-
tice Harlan expressed concern that it had moved “too fast and far in the 
other direction,”65 effectively insulating the Federal Rules from chal-
lenge for improperly infringing on state lawmaking prerogatives. 
C.  Sibbach’s Inadequacies Revealed 
Hanna’s clear distinction between the power that resides in the 
Federal Rules to override state lawmaking choices and the more quali-
fied power of federal judge-made law to do the same yielded radically 
different tests for the validity of those two forms of federal lawmaking.  
 
ties,” and because there was a strong federal policy concerning the allocation of power 
between judge and jury, the “policy of uniform enforcement of state-created rights and 
obligations” did not require application of the state rule).  As we discuss below, Byrd’s 
“affirmative countervailing considerations,” id. at 537, if properly disciplined, can in-
form a more robust form of federal common law than has developed in the wake of 
Hanna.  The Byrd Court did not discipline that concept, perhaps because the influence 
of the Seventh Amendment seemed so clear and also because the Court had not yet 
grasped Hanna’s central insight about the relevance of different sources of federal 
lawmaking power.  See id. at 537-38 & n.12 (citing Sibbach for the proposition that 
“[t]he policy of uniform enforcement of state-created rights and obligations cannot in 
every case exact compliance with a state rule”). 
63 See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 463-74 (1965) (clarifying the intersection be-
tween the Federal Rules and state laws); see also Whitten, supra note 56, at 12 (“A more 
complete salvation for the Rules had to await the Court’s decision in Hanna . . . .”). 
64 See John Hart Ely, The Irrepressible Myth of Erie, 87 HARV. L. REV. 693, 698-99 (1974) 
(“By essentially obliterating the Enabling Act in Sibbach v. Wilson & Co. in 1941, [the 
Court] created a need for limits on the Rules, a need it subsequently filled not by recon-
sidering Sibbach, but rather by an undefended application of the Erie line of prece-
dents. . . . All that should have changed in 1965, however, with the decision in Han-
na . . . .”); see also id. at 720 (“[T]he text of the opinion did little more, so far as the 
interpretation of the Enabling Act was concerned, than point to Sibbach.”); id. at 693 
(noting that Professor Ely was a law clerk to Chief Justice Warren during the term that 
Warren authored the Court’s opinion in Hanna). 
65 Hanna, 380 U.S. at 476 (Harlan, J., concurring) (cautioning against “setting up the 
Federal Rules as a body of law inviolate”).  Thus, both the majority and, to the extent that 
he had the Enabling Act in mind, Justice Harlan perpetuated Sibbach’s myth that federal-
ism, rather than separation-of-powers, concerns animate the Enabling Act’s limitations. 
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As a result, the Court’s incentive to give Federal Rules a restrained in-
terpretation shifted from the cloud of Erie’s “brooding omnipresence” 
to the cloud of Sibbach’s ever-more-evident inadequacy.  Putting aside 
the concerns that in fact animated the Enabling Act’s limitations and 
the goal of the Sibbach Court not to invite “endless litigation”66 about 
the new Federal Rules, the interpretation of “substantive rights” as 
confined to “rights conferred by law to be protected and enforced in 
accordance with the adjective law of judicial procedure”67 was increa-
singly out of touch with the way in which law was made and applied in 
the United States.  So too was the notion that prospective supervisory 
court rules may displace the policy choices of lawmakers (federal or 
state) as long as they “really regulate[] procedure—the judicial 
process for enforcing rights and duties recognized by substantive law 
and for justly administering remedy and redress for disregard or in-
fraction of them.”68 
The 1960s and 1970s brought broad recognition of the inability of 
traditional two-party litigation, which depends upon the traditional 
market for legal services, to provide adequate enforcement of statutes 
designed to cure the imperfections of the common law, provide equal 
economic opportunity, or otherwise implement important social 
norms.  Inclined to rely on litigation in place of, or in addition to, 
centralized administrative enforcement, lawmakers employed a variety 
of techniques—in addition to new liability rules—to stimulate private 
enforcement.  These techniques included multiple (e.g., treble) or 
punitive damages, statutory damages, attorney-fee shifting, and, as we 
shall discuss in Part III concerning New York law, class actions.  Al-
though these techniques for stimulating private enforcement were not 
new, their incidence increased enormously in the period in question.69 
 
66 See Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 14 (1941) (“If we were to adopt the sug-
gested criterion of the importance of the alleged right [for the definition of “substan-
tive rights”], we should invite endless litigation and confusion worse confounded.”). 
67 Id. at 13. 
68 Id. at 14. 
69 See, e.g., Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assocs., Inc., 483 U.S. 143, 151 
(1987) (“Both RICO and the Clayton Act are designed to remedy economic injury by 
providing for the recovery of treble damages, costs, and attorney’s fees.”); City of Ri-
verside v. Rivera, 477 U.S. 561, 574-80 (1986) (reasoning that Congress granted attor-
neys’ fees under § 1988 because of the public benefit created by civil rights litigation); 
Deposit Guar. Nat’l Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 338-39 (1980) (positing that the in-
centives class actions provide to lawyers are “a natural outgrowth of the increasing re-
liance on the ‘private attorney general’ for the vindication of legal rights”); Newman v. 
Piggie Park Enters., Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 401-03 (1968) (explaining that attorneys’ fees 
are necessary in Title II cases to encourage those injured by racial discrimination to 
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The disconnect between Sibbach’s incomplete and dichotomous vi-
sion of the legal landscape and emerging legislative views about pri-
vate enforcement was made obvious by the controversy that greeted 
the application of Rule 68 (Offer of Judgment) to cases governed by a 
federal fee-shifting statute and successive proposals to amend Rule 68 
in the early 1980s.  Although the Court simply ignored the Enabling 
Act question that the operation of the existing version of Rule 68 
posed,70 the proposals to amend it attracted vigorous and very public 
opposition.  The first such proposal would have authorized the federal 
courts to displace legislative policy choices concerning attorney-fee 
shifting in federal question cases under the Civil Rights Acts, choices 
that Congress deemed essential to the adequate enforcement of those 
 
seek judicial relief); Davis v. Werne, 673 F.2d 866, 869 (5th Cir. 1982) (clarifying that 
statutory damages are available under the Truth-in-Lending Act to encourage “private 
attorneys general” to aid in its enforcement). 
 For a rich and fascinating study of private enforcement of federal statutes that uses 
both econometric techniques and detailed historical analysis to test the author’s hypo-
theses, see SEAN FARHANG, THE LITIGATION STATE:  PUBLIC REGULATION AND PRIVATE 
LAWSUITS IN THE U.S. (2010).  As Farhang documents, although Congress’s use of prop-
laintiff fee shifting or multiple or punitive damages (or both) to stimulate private en-
forcement began in the second half of the nineteenth century, it exploded in the late 
1960s and the 1970s. See, e.g., id. at 66 fig. 3.1.  The author was kind enough to provide us 
with his database of federal statutes containing such enforcement tools.  According to 
our tally, although only three federal statutes contained such provisions from 1887 to 
1899, and only twenty-six did so between 1900 and 1959, ten statutes contained one or 
both in the period from 1964 to 1969, and sixty did so in statutes enacted between 1970 
and 1979.  Farhang shows that, contrary to one hypothesis, the preference for litigation 
over administrative enforcement has not always been confined to Democrats—indeed, 
Republicans were responsible for that choice in the Civil Rights Act of 1964—but that in 
periods of divided government, the preference for litigation consistently has reflected 
concern about over- or underenforcement if the administrative enforcement option were 
pursued (because an ideologically distant executive could subvert congressional prefe-
rences).  See id. at 76-78, 81, 127. 
70 See Marek v. Chesny, 473 U.S. 1 (1985).  The Court may have done so because 
Justice Brennan’s dissent (joined by Justices Marshall and Blackmun) made it clear 
that engaging that question would require repudiation of Sibbach’s federalism account.  
See id. at 35-38 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Court’s interpretation of 
Rule 68 was inconsistent with § 1988).  Although taking a different view of the merits 
than did the dissenters, the Solicitor General’s amicus brief also alerted the Court to 
Sibbach’s inadequacies, citing both the 1926 Senate Report and the research that estab-
lished the historical support for a separation-of-powers account of the Enabling Act’s 
limitations.  See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, 
Marek v. Chesny, 473 U.S. 1 (1985) (No. 83-1437), 1984 WL 565432, at *25 n.19 (“The 
legislative history of the Rules Enabling Act supports [the separation-of-powers] con-
struction of section 2072.”); Stephen B. Burbank, Proposals to Amend Rule 68—Time to 
Abandon Ship, 19 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 425, 433 n.42 (1986) (suggesting that if the 
Court had addressed the Enabling Act issue in Marek, it might have had to reformulate 
its interpretation of the Act).  
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statutes.  The second, albeit less obviously (because under the cloak of 
the sanctions label) and less intrusively, would nonetheless have au-
thorized some displacement of congressional policy choices designed 
to stimulate private enforcement.71  Both attracted attention and ad-
verse comment in Congress and were influential in an ultimately un-
successful attempt to prompt the Court to abandon Sibbach.72 
D.  The Court’s Incoherent Jurisprudence of Scope 
Hanna’s reconfiguration of the Erie doctrine, while solving some 
problems, left the federal courts ill-equipped to interpret the scope of 
the Federal Rules during the very period when the potential impact of 
those Rules on important questions of liability and regulatory policy 
was becoming clear.  In this respect, the Court had only itself to blame 
for the belief of some litigants and lower courts that Hanna had over-
ruled Ragan.73  For, ironically in light of Justice Scalia’s responses to 
the concurring and dissenting opinions in Shady Grove,74 the Hanna 
Court manufactured a “direct collision” by dissecting a Massachusetts 
statute that prescribed service of process as a means to toll its limita-
tions period and misrepresenting the statute’s paragraphs as designed 
to address limitations and service separately.75  Presumably, the Court 
granted review in Walker to dispel the confusion for which it was re-
 
71 See Burbank, supra note 70, at 426-30, 435-39 (discussing proposed amendments 
to Rule 68 and their effect on congressional policy choices); see also Marek, 473 U.S. at 
38-41 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (providing an overview of discussions regarding 
amendments to Rule 68). 
72 See H.R. REP. NO. 99-422, at 13 (1985) (discussing the criticism of the 1983 and 
1984 proposals to amend Rule 68); Burbank, Hold the Corks, supra note 12, at 1031-33 
(discussing the House Judiciary Committee Report on the bill that subsequently served 
as the cornerstone of the 1988 amendments); Burbank, supra note 70, at 438-40 
(highlighting continued debates regarding the amendment of Rule 68). 
73 See Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740, 749 n.8 (1980) (“Mr. Justice Harlan 
in his concurring opinion in Hanna concluded that Ragan was no longer good law.”). 
74 See Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431, 1440 
(2010) (“But even accepting the dissent’s account of the Legislature’s objective at face 
value, it cannot override the statute’s clear text.”); id. at 1445 (Scalia, J., for himself, 
Roberts, C.J., and Thomas, J.) (“[Sibbach] leaves no room for special exemptions based 
on the function or purpose of a particular state rule.”). 
75 See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 462-63 n.1; Burbank, supra note 5, at 1174 
(“The court of appeals’ gloss confirms what a fair reading of the statute as a whole sug-
gests, namely that the statutory provisions in question were the functional equivalent of a 
tolling rule.”); see also Hanna, 380 U.S. at 478 (Harlan, J., concurring) (“The evident in-
tent of the statute is to permit an executor to distribute the estate which he is administer-
ing without fear that further liabilities may be outstanding for which he could be held 
personally liable.”).  This helps to explain why Justice Harlan thought that Hanna was 
indistinguishable from Ragan and that the latter should be overruled.  See id. at 476-78. 
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sponsible.  No longer saddled with Erie jurisprudence that cast the va-
lidity of Rule 3 in doubt, but saddled instead with Hanna’s retrospec-
tive explanation of Ragan as a reading of Rule 3,76 the Justices sought 
to clarify the circumstances in which Hanna’s test for the validity of a 
Federal Rule, which is virtually impossible to fail, and its test (in dic-
tum) for the validity of judge-made federal law, which is very hard to 
satisfy, would apply.  Unfortunately, the effort clarified nothing. 
The Walker Court observed that Hanna’s Federal Rule analysis ap-
plies only if “the scope of the Federal Rule in fact is sufficiently broad 
to control the issue before the Court,”77 but it cautioned that courts 
should not narrowly construe Federal Rules “in order to avoid a ‘di-
rect collision’” when their “plain meaning” required otherwise.78  Like 
the majority opinion in Shady Grove, the Walker Court’s subsequent 
reasoning fortifies skepticism about the general utility of “plain mean-
ing” interpretation.  Rather than resting on the language of the Rule, 
the Court adduced the Advisory Committee Note and then read that 
Note tendentiously79 when it concluded that “[t]here is no indication 
that the Rule was intended to toll a state statute of limitations.”80  
Moreover, the Court addressed the policies underlying state law be-
fore concluding that “Rule 3 does not replace such policy determina-
tions found in state law,”81 not explaining how the plain meaning of 
Rule 3 could depend upon the content of state law.  Finally and in-
credibly, when the Court confronted the operation of Rule 3 in a fed-
eral question case in West v. Conrail, it discovered a “plain meaning” 
that was altogether different.82 
 
76 See Hanna, 380 U.S. at 470 & n.12 (citing Ragan as a case in which the Court 
found “the scope of [a] Federal Rule was not as broad as the losing party urged” so 
“Erie commanded the enforcement of state law”); Whitten, supra note 56, at 13 (ex-
plaining that Hanna reinterpreted Ragan). 
77 Walker, 446 U.S. at 749-50. 
78 Id. at 750 n.9. 
79 See id. at 750 n.10 (“[The Note] does not indicate . . . that Rule 3 was intended to 
serve as a tolling provision for statute of limitations purposes; it only suggests that the 
Advisory Committee thought that the Rule might have that effect.”).  “In fact, it is poss-
ible to infer from the published sources that the Advisory Committee intended Rule 3 
to have a tolling effect, if that were within the Court’s power under the Act.”  Burbank, 
supra note 5, at 1159 n.620. 
80 Walker, 446 U.S. at 750. 
81 Id. at 751-52. 
82 See West v. Conrail, 481 U.S. 35, 39 (1987) (“[W]hen the underlying cause of 
action is based on federal law and the absence of an express federal statute of limita-
tions makes it necessary to borrow a limitations period from another statute, the ac-
tion is not barred if it has been ‘commenced’ in compliance with Rule 3 within the 
borrowed period.”).   
BURBANK&WOLFF FINAL REVISED.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 11/18/2010  10:59 AM 
2010] Missed Opportunities of Shady Grove 37 
Lurking beneath the surface of Walker, there may have been an 
awareness that even though Sibbach’s “test” for the validity of a Federal 
Rule under the Enabling Act could have supported a reading of 
Rule 3 that included a tolling function, categorical choices as to both 
the period of limitations and the event that tolls that period have a 
predictable and direct effect on rights under the substantive law (fed-
eral or state).  By determining whether those rights subsist, policy 
choices about tolling and the limitations period thus abridge, enlarge, 
or modify substantive rights.83  Lurking beneath the surface of West, on 
the other hand, may have been the view that the Enabling Act imposes 
no limitations in federal question cases, which seems unlikely if only 
because unthinkable.  Alternatively, perhaps the West Court believed 
that Federal Rules are insulated against challenge under the Enabling 
Act when they incorporate or reflect rules that federal courts validly 
have fashioned or could fashion as federal common law—a more sub-
tle approach, but one for which there is no evidence in the opinion.84 
In an interpretive landscape where “direct collisions” are manu-
factured, the same language has multiple “plain meanings,” and the 
governing precedent (Sibbach) is hopelessly out of step with legal de-
velopments, it is no surprise that, since Walker, the Justices have 
lurched from one extreme to the other, giving some Federal Rules a 
scope of application broader than appears plausible—certainly, 
broader than necessary to escape a charge of infidelity to the text—
while emptying others of content.  We strongly suspect that the unify-
ing characteristic of these decisions has been an awareness that, al-
though Hanna cleaned up some of the mess engendered (or facili-
tated) by Erie, it did not clean up enough. 
 
With sleight of hand that still leaves me blinking, the Court in West supplied a 
different “plain meaning” to Rule 3 for federal question cases and did not 
consider the Enabling Act problems that interpretation might be thought to 
present.  In particular, the Court did not consider the fact that the original 
Advisory Committee, in a Note which had been quoted in Walker, feared such 
problems in both federal question and diversity cases. 
Burbank, Rules and Discretion, supra note 12, at 702 (footnotes omitted). 
83 Cf. Walker, 446 U.S. at 751 (“In contrast to Rule 3, the Oklahoma statute is a 
statement of a substantive decision by that State that actual service on . . . the defen-
dant is an integral part of the several policies served by the statute of limitations.”).   
84 See Burbank, Rules and Discretion, supra note 12, at 703-09 (discussing this theory 
with reference to West).  On the problem of incorporating in Federal Rules federal law 
that is (or was) valid under other sources of authority, see Burbank, supra note 5, at 
1147-57, 1165-68.  West may be viewed as an example of reverse incorporation—that is, 
using a Federal Rule as a source for a common law rule.  It fares no better from that 
perspective.  See id. at 1158-63 (examining tolling statutes and reverse incorporation). 
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In Burlington Northern Railroad Co. v. Woods,85 the Court may have 
found it difficult to read Appellate Rule 38 (dealing with discretionary 
sanctions for frivolous appeals) to collide directly with state law (pro-
viding a mandatory ten-percent penalty when a stayed judgment is af-
firmed on appeal).  The Court may thus have believed that it would 
have been necessary to apply the state statute under Hanna’s modified 
outcome-determination test.86  The Court may also have believed, 
however, that federal law should control whether, when, and to what 
extent financial consequences attendant on continued lack of success 
shape losing federal court litigants’ incentives to appeal.  Or at least it 
may have so believed given the existence not only of Appellate 
Rule 38, on which it primarily relied, but also of 28 U.S.C. § 1912 (au-
thorizing federal appellate courts to award delay damages and single 
or double costs to the prevailing party in their discretion),87 Appellate 
Rule 37 (dealing with postjudgment interest),88 and 28 U.S.C. § 1961 
(dealing with prejudgment interest),89 which it also cited.90  That 
might explain why the Court in Burlington Northern framed “the initial 
step” as “to determine whether Federal Rule 38 is ‘sufficiently broad’ 
to cause a ‘direct collision’ with the state law or, implicitly, to ‘control 
the issue’ before the court, thereby leaving no room for the operation 
of that law.”91  Moreover, it might explain why the Court focused not 
just on the fact that Appellate Rule 38’s “discretionary mode of opera-
tion unmistakably conflicts with the mandatory provision of Alabama’s 
affirmance penalty,”92 but also on the fact that “the purposes underlying 
 
85 480 U.S. 1 (1987). 
86 See Whitten, supra note 56, at 35-41 (discussing the questions raised by Burling-
ton Northern, including those raised by Rule 38).  
87 28 U.S.C. § 1912 (2006). 
88 FED. R. APP. P. 37. 
89 28 U.S.C. § 1961. 
90 See Burlington Northern, 480 U.S. at 4, 7 n.5. 
91 Id. at 4-5 (quoting Walker, 446 U.S. at 749-50 & n.9).  The problem is that the 
question “whether the scope of the Federal Rule in fact is sufficiently broad to control 
the issue before the Court,” Walker, 446 U.S. at 749-50, and the question whether there 
is a “direct collision,” id. at 750 n.9, between the Federal Rule and state law, are not 
obviously the same question, even though the Walker Court seemed to conflate them.  
Logic indicates, . . . and a careful reading of the relevant passages confirms, 
that [the “direct collision”] language is not meant to mandate that federal law 
and state law be perfectly coextensive and equally applicable to the issue at 
hand; rather, the “direct collision” language, at least where the applicability of 
a federal statute is at issue, expresses the requirement that the federal statute 
be sufficiently broad to cover the point in dispute. 
Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 26 n.4 (1988). 
92 Burlington Northern, 480 U.S. at 7. 
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the Rule are sufficiently coextensive with the asserted purposes of the 
Alabama statute to indicate that the Rule occupies the statute’s field of 
operation so as to preclude its application in federal diversity actions.”93 
On this view, whereas the Walker Court was preoccupied by con-
flict preemption, the Burlington Northern Court was, tentatively and al-
ternatively, suggesting the possibility of field preemption.  Moreover, 
in doing so, the Court relied on an analysis of the purposes underly-
ing the respective laws in determining whether federal and state law 
could coexist.94  The opinion would have been more persuasive if the 
Court had explicitly relied on all of the statutes and Federal Rules 
deemed pertinent, including presumably the statutes governing fed-
eral appellate jurisdiction, and if it had discussed policy considera-
tions in addition to judicial discretion.95  If the Court had understood 
that the analysis of scope involves reasoning akin to that underlying 
federal common law that is designed to implement the purposes and 
policies of federal statutes and Federal Rules,96 it could have made a 
major contribution to the jurisprudence in the area, a matter we pur-
sue further below.  Instead, its unanimous opinion led one acute ob-
 
93 Id.; cf. Stewart, 487 U.S. at 30 (“Our cases make clear that, as between these two 
choices in a single ‘field of operation,’ the instructions of Congress are supreme.” (ci-
tation omitted)). 
94 See Burlington Northern, 480 U.S. at 4 (purposes of state mandatory affirmance 
penalty); id. at 7 (purposes of Rule 38). 
95 See Whitten, supra note 56, at 22 (criticizing the Court’s response to the fact that 
Alabama had a rule akin to Appellate Rule 38); id. at 23 (noting that an interpretation 
of Appellate Rule 38 as implicitly “negating the power to impose penalties for unsuc-
cessful appeals in cases not expressly covered by its terms” would have to distinguish 
Cohen); id. at 23 n.117 (acknowledging that 28 U.S.C. § 1912 presented a “more plausi-
ble case for implied negation,” but noting that the Court did not discuss it); id. at 25 
(“To interpret Federal Rule 37 and 28 U.S.C. § 1961 as sufficiently broad in scope to 
cover the ground covered by the Alabama statute, one would again have to interpret 
the language of the federal provisions as impliedly negating the operation of all other 
laws that compensate a victorious appellee for loss of use of the judgment proceeds 
during the course of an unsuccessful appeal.”).  Professor Whitten thus separately re-
sponded to elements that in combination might have yielded a persuasive opinion.  
Note, moreover, that his consideration of the possible influence of federal jurisdic-
tional policy was part of an analysis of the proper result if there were no pertinent Fed-
eral Rule, was hobbled by the uncertain status of Byrd, and did not distinguish between 
conflict and field preemption.  See id. at 38-41.  
96 See Burbank, Interjurisdictional Preclusion, supra note 12, at 812-17 (discussing cir-
cumstances in which state law borrowed as federal common law should be displaced 
and distinguishing between “cases in which state preclusion law yields to federal com-
mon law in domestic litigation because a particular state rule is found hostile to or in-
consistent with a particular federal substantive policy,” and “occasions when state law is 
at odds, not with specifically identifiable federal substantive policies, but with the sum 
of such policies, that is, a scheme of federal substantive rights as a whole”). 
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server to worry that “analysis of Federal Rules–state law conflicts ha[d] 
reached a dead end in the Supreme Court.”97 
Conversely, in Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, Inc.,98 with Justice 
Scalia (joined by two other dissenting Justices) contending that 
Rule 59 was in “‘direct collision’” with state law regarding the standard 
judges should apply in ruling on motions for a new trial based on the 
asserted excessiveness of the verdict,99 the Court reasoned that “there 
[was] no candidate for [governance of the question whether damages 
are excessive] other than the law that gives rise to the claim for re-
lief.”100  In support, the Court cited, inter alia, the Enabling Act and 
commentary noting that the Court had “interpret[ed] the federal 
rules to avoid conflict with important state regulatory policies.”101 
Finally, in Semtek International, Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp.,102 the 
Court acknowledged that reading Rule 41(b) to prescribe a rule of 
preclusion that had interjurisdictional effect “would arguably violate”103 
the Enabling Act and “would in many cases violate the federalism prin-
ciple of Erie.”104  Rather than directly confronting those problems and, 
in the process, revisiting Sibbach’s impoverished account of “substantive 
rights,” the Court engaged in a process that can only charitably be de-
scribed as interpretation and only in Wonderland as an exercise in 
“plain meaning” interpretation.  The Court reasoned that Rule 41(b), 
which prescribes the effect of an involuntary dismissal, speaks only to 
the ability of a claimant to “return[] later, to the same court, with the 
same underlying claim.”105  The opinion rummaged in dictionaries and 
 
97 Whitten, supra note 56, at 41. 
98 518 U.S. 415 (1996). 
99 See id. at 467-68 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Burlington Northern, 480 U.S. at 
5).  Readers who are struck by the radical inconsistency between Justice Scalia’s ap-
proach for the Court in Shady Grove and his approach for the Court in Semtek, see infra 
text accompanying notes 102-06, should compare his dissenting opinions in Gasperini 
and Stewart.  Indeed, the passage in Justice Ginsburg’s opinion for the Court in Gaspe-
rini that is quoted in the text following this footnote may have drawn inspiration from 
Justice Scalia’s dissent in Stewart.  See Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 35 
(1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[T]he Court’s description of the issue begs the ques-
tion:  what law governs whether the forum-selection clause is a valid or invalid alloca-
tion of any inconvenience between the parties.”). 
100 Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 437 n.22. 
101 Id. at 438 n.22 (quoting RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., DANIEL J. MELTZER & DAVID 
L. SHAPIRO, HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 
729-30 (4th ed. 1996)). 
102 531 U.S. 497 (2001). 
103 Id. at 503. 
104 Id. at 504. 
105 Id. at 505. 
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engaged in multiple wordplays to reach a result that is demonstrably er-
roneous according to two very different interpretive techniques, includ-
ing one that Justice Scalia, the author of the Court’s opinion, usually 
favors:  the exercise of logic in divining “plain meaning.”106 
E.  Reinterpreting the Enabling Act 
Thus, as we pursue further in Part III, the Shady Grove Court’s 
wooden interpretation of Rule 23 was hardly ordained by precedent.  
Moreover, although the Court has never held a Federal Rule invalid, 
that is hardly cause for the institutional self-satisfaction that Justice 
Scalia’s opinion manifests.107  The limitations in question, after all, 
concern the powers of the very institution that is interpreting them.108  
Moreover, the Congress that allowed the original Federal Rules to go 
into effect notwithstanding the objection of Senate leaders was as-
sured that “the Court will be zealous to correct its mistake, if any has 
been made.”109  And, as part of the successful campaign to persuade 
 
106 See Stephen B. Burbank, Semtek, Forum Shopping, and Federal Common Law, 77 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1027, 1039-47 (2002) (describing the discussion of Rule 41(b) in 
Semtek).  As demonstrated there, the published and unpublished record concerning 
Rule 41(b)’s intended meaning contradicts the Court’s interpretation.  Id. at 1042-46.  
In addition,  
[f]or those who are not disposed to consult or consider such materials, the 
Court’s error (as a matter of interpretation) in confining the effects of a Rule 
41(b) dismissal to the rendering court seems clear in light of the following con-
sideration:  if that had been the intended ambit of the rule, it would not have 
made sense to except dismissals for lack of jurisdiction and improper venue, since 
under the doctrine of direct estoppel (issue preclusion), the plaintiff would have 
been precluded from refiling the case in the same court in any event. 
Id. at 1046-47 (footnotes omitted). 
107 See Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1131, 1447 
(2010) (Scalia, J., for himself, Roberts, C.J., and Thomas, J.) (“Undoubtedly some hard 
cases will arise (though we have managed to muddle through well enough in the 69 
years since Sibbach was decided).”); see also id. at 1442 (Scalia, J., for himself, Roberts, 
C.J., Thomas, J., and Sotomayor, J.) (“Applying [the Sibbach ‘really regulates proce-
dure’] test, we have rejected every statutory challenge to a Federal Rule that has come 
before us.”). 
108 See Burbank, supra note 5, at 1101-02 (“The statutory limitations in question 
were intended to confine the power of the Court itself, a fact that requires that the 
Court ever be open to the reconsideration of past interpretations on sufficient demon-
stration that it has erred in interpreting the statute’s meaning.”); Paul J. Mishkin, Some 
Further Last Words on Erie—The Thread, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1682, 1687 (1974) (noting the 
“inherent tendency of any institution to extend its own reach and power”). 
109 Letter from Edgar B. Tolman to the Honorable Joseph C. O’Mahoney, the 
Honorable William H. King, the Honorable Edward R. Burke, and the Honorable 
Warren R. Austin (May 26, 1938), reprinted in Hearings on S.J. Res. 281 Before a Subcomm. 
of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 75th Cong., pt. 2, app. at 72 (1938).  
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the House not to insist on repeal of the supersession clause in the 
1988 amendments to the Enabling Act, Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote 
a letter asserting that the Judicial Conference and its committees 
“have always been keenly aware of the special responsibility they have 
in the rules process and the duty incumbent upon them not to over-
reach their charter.”110  In addition, as suggested above, the failure to 
find a violation of the Enabling Act has frequently been made possi-
ble through Federal Rule interpretations that were restrained without 
being enlightened, many of which reflected implicit acknowledgment 
of the inadequacy of Sibbach, both in its federalism account of the 
Enabling Act’s limitations and its narrow view of the substantive 
rights that are protected. 
As in Sibbach itself, the Court was made aware of the former defect 
in Marek v. Chesny,111 and both Justice Brennan’s dissent in that case112 
and Justice Kennedy’s dissent in Business Guides, Inc. v. Chromatic Com-
munications Enterprises, Inc.113 made it plain that separation-of-powers 
values must be served if the Enabling Act is not to be a dead letter in 
federal question cases.  Moreover, since the research that uncovered 
the historical support for a separation-of-powers account was published, 
many, if not most, commentators have acknowledged that Sibbach’s fe-
deralism account is erroneous.114  This view is also clearly reflected in 
the legislative history of the 1988 amendments to the Enabling Act,115 
which the Court has never deigned to cite, for obvious reasons. 
 
With the exception of cases in which it has read Federal Rules not to apply, 
however, the main thing the Supreme Court has been zealous about in consi-
dering challenges to their validity has been taking cover behind the process 
employed prior to their effective date, particularly that part of it permitting 
congressional review. 
Burbank, supra note 5, at 1179. 
110 Letter from the Honorable William H. Rehnquist to the Honorable Peter W. 
Rodino, Jr. (Oct. 19, 1988), reprinted in 134 CONG. REC. 31,873-74 (1988).  But see Bur-
bank, Hold the Corks, supra note 12, at 1038 n.163 (arguing that the rulemakers have 
“not always been keenly aware of” their duties). 
111 473 U.S. 1 (1985). 
112 See supra note 70 (discussing Justice Brennan’s dissent). 
113 498 U.S. 533, 554-70 (1991) (Kennedy, J., dissenting); see also id. at 565 (“But 
Congress wanted the definition of substantive rights left to itself in cases where federal 
law applies, or to the States where state substantive law governs.”).  
114 See, e.g., Leslie M. Kelleher, Taking “Substantive Rights” (in the Rules Enabling Act) 
More Seriously, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 47, 92 (1998) (stating that the separation-of-
powers account is now “generally accepted,” supplanting the “myth of federalism”).  
115 See H.R. REP. NO. 99-422, at 20-21 (1985) (“[I]t is not the purpose of proposed 
section 2072 merely to restate whatever may be the constitutional restraints on the ex-
ercise of Congress’ lawmaking power as against that of the States . . . .”).  This Report 
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Virtually incoherent as an example of the interpretive technique it 
prescribes, both standing alone and when paired with West v. Conrail, 
the Walker decision appears to reflect doubts about Sibbach’s adequacy 
in limning the substantive rights that are relevant under the Enabling 
Act.  Further, the Marek Court’s ostrich approach notwithstanding, 
Justice Brennan’s dissent in that case, which included discussion of 
congressional views rejecting proposals to amend Rule 68 on the 
ground that federal attorney-fee shifting provisions confer a substan-
tive right, is additional evidence supporting such doubts.116  The law 
that determines “whether damages are excessive”117 for purposes of a 
motion for a new trial is not unambiguously within the narrow reach 
of substantive law that Sibbach shields from prospective supervisory 
court rulemaking.  Nonetheless, the Gasperini Court cited the Enabl-
ing Act as the first item of support for a reference to state law.118  Final-
ly, Justice Scalia’s opinion in Semtek suggests that, if he had not rewrit-
ten Rule 41(b), the Court would have held that it violated the 
Enabling Act.  If so, however, that would not have been because rules 
of preclusion are rules of substantive law in the Sibbach sense.119 
Since there was no majority opinion on the interpretation of the 
Enabling Act in Shady Grove, it remains possible that the Court will 
find an occasion to reconsider Sibbach in the foreseeable future.  If so, 
we hope that the occasion will be a case in which, as in Marek and 
Business Guides, federal substantive law governs.  For if the Court ac-
cepts, as realistically it must, that the Enabling Act is not a dead letter 
in federal question cases, that may make it easier to accept what the 
historical record underlying both the 1934 Act and the 1988 amend-
ments establishes:  the primary purpose of the Enabling Act’s proce-
dure/substance dichotomy is to allocate prospective federal lawmak-
ing between the Supreme Court and Congress, not to protect 
lawmaking choices already made, and certainly not to protect state 
lawmaking choices exclusively.  To be sure, allocation standards may 
have the salutary effect of protecting existing lawmaking choices.  In-
deed, it is reasonable to impute to Congress a concern for protecting 
state lawmaking choices that affect state substantive rights, since that 
body often invokes federalism as warranting solicitude for state pre-
 
was “specifically incorporated by reference in the Report of the 1988 House bill.”  Bur-
bank, Hold the Corks, supra note 12, at 1031. 
116 See supra note 70. 
117 Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 437 n.22 (1996). 
118 See supra text accompanying notes 98-101. 
119 See supra text accompanying notes 102-06. 
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rogatives.  But that is a secondary consequence of the Enabling Act’s 
primary concern, which is preventing the Supreme Court, exercising 
delegated legislative power to promulgate court rules, from encroach-
ing upon Congress’s lawmaking prerogatives.  Once this is clear, it is 
easier to see that Professor Ely’s work on the Enabling Act,120 although 
helpful in showing how Hanna disaggregated the “Erie problem,” pro-
posed the wrong path for dealing with Sibbach’s inadequacies, and 
Hanna’s as well.121 
The path is wrong because it perpetuates the federalism myth that 
Sibbach initiated and Hanna reaffirmed.  It is also wrong because, not 
laid out to reflect that the Act exists primarily to allocate lawmaking 
power prospectively, it leads those who take it to seek substantive 
rights in the wrong places.  Ironically, in a number of cases where we 
believe that the realization of Sibbach’s inadequacy influenced the de-
cision, the Court followed that wayward path in seeking to ascertain 
the rights that call for protection.  As an example, the problem with 
court rulemaking on the tolling rules for statutes of limitations is not 
that some such rules are themselves “substantive,” as the Court sug-
gests in Walker when discussing state statutes.122  It is rather that the 
lawmaking choices required when framing all such rules may predict-
ably and directly affect rights under the substantive law to which the 
limitations periods in question pertain—abridging, enlarging, or mod-
ifying those rights, federal or state.  The same is true of preclusion 
rules, a fact that the Semtek Court, or at least Justice Scalia, may have 
grasped but chose to avoid by turning Rule 41(b) into something that 
those who drafted it would not have recognized. 
Indeed, we think Justice Scalia likely did understand that preclu-
sion rules would violate the Enabling Act, and he may even have seen 
that there was a way to reach that conclusion under Sibbach and its 
progeny.  After all, the Sibbach Court left open the possibility that 
prospective supervisory court rules that ostensibly regulate the litiga-
tion process might be invalid because they in fact regulate rights un-
der the substantive law “in the guise of regulating procedure.”123  
 
120 Ely, supra note 64, at 718-40.  
121 See Burbank, Hold the Corks, supra note 12, at 1017-18 (arguing that Ely’s “ap-
proach substitutes restrictions on rule application for restrictions on rule formula-
tion”); Burbank, supra note 5, at 1122-23, 1127 n.510, 1180-81, 1187-88, 1191 n.752 
(detailing the flaws in Ely’s approach). 
122 See supra text accompanying note 12. 
123 See Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., Inc., 312 U.S. 1, 10 (1941) (“The first [proviso or 
caveat in the Enabling Act] is that the court shall not ‘abridge, enlarge, nor modify 
substantive rights,’ in the guise of regulating procedure.”).  For other routes to a nar-
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Moreover, in the Murphree case, which the Hanna Court also cited (in 
addition to citing Sibbach),124 the Court left open the possibility that 
court rules regulating procedure in the Sibbach sense might nonethe-
less be invalid if they had greater than “incidental effects” on the en-
forcement of the substantive law.125  In addition, the Murphree Court’s 
reliance on postpromulgation statements “by the authorized spokes-
men for the Advisory Committee”126 suggested that the purpose of the 
drafters is relevant in determining meaning and validity.   
To be sure, these signals were muted by the Court’s subsequent 
reasoning that, although Rule 4(f) “will undoubtedly affect those 
[substantive] rights . . . it does not operate to abridge, enlarge or 
modify the rules of decision by which th[e] court will adjudicate its 
rights.”127  Still, there should have been no doubt about the substantive 
rights that are relevant.  Moreover, decisions rejecting Enabling Act 
challenges to Rule 11, in which the Court effectively responded to at-
tempts by lower-court judges to turn that rule into either “a fee-
shifting statute” or a collection of torts,128 suggest the practical utility 
 
rowing construction of Sibbach, see Burbank, supra note 5, at 1029 n.59, 1033 n.71, 
1195.  See also Burbank, supra note 70, at 432. 
The examples the concurrence offers—statutes of limitations, burdens of 
proof, and standards for appellate review of damages awards—do not make its 
broad definition of substantive rights more persuasive.  They merely illustrate 
that in rare cases it may be difficult to determine whether a rule “really regu-
lates” procedure or substance.  If one concludes the latter, there is no pre-
emption of the state rule; the Federal Rule itself is invalid. 
Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431, 1446 n.13 (2010) 
(Scalia, J., for himself, Roberts, C.J., and Thomas, J.). 
124 See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 464-65 (1965). 
125 See Mississippi Publ’g Corp. v. Murphree, 326 U.S. 438, 445 (1946) (“Congress’ 
prohibition of any alteration of substantive rights of litigants was obviously not ad-
dressed to such incidental effects as necessarily attend the adoption of the prescribed 
new rules of procedure upon the rights of litigants who, agreeably to rules of practice 
and procedure, have been brought before a court authorized to determine their 
rights.”); see also Burlington N. R.R. v. Woods, 480 U.S. 1, 5 (1987) (“Rules which inci-
dentally affect litigants’ substantive rights do not violate this provision if reasonably 
necessary to maintain the integrity of that system of rules.”). 
126 Murphree, 326 U.S. at 444. 
127 Id. at 446. 
128 See Bus. Guides, Inc. v. Chromatic Commc’ns Enters., Inc., 498 U.S. 533, 553 
(1991) (“Rule 11 is not a fee-shifting statute . . . .”); id. (“Also without merit is Business 
Guides’ argument that Rule 11 creates a federal common law of malicious prosecu-
tion.”); Cooter & Gell v. Hartmax Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 409 (1990) (“Rule 11 is not a 
fee-shifting statute . . . .”).  Among the lower-court opinions these decisions implicitly 
rejected, see, for example, Hays v. Sony Corp. of Am., 847 F.2d 412, 418-19 (7th Cir. 
1988), and Szabo Food Serv., Inc. v. Canteen Corp., 823 F.2d 1073, 1083 (7th Cir. 
1987).  See also AM. JUDICATURE SOC’Y, RULE 11 IN TRANSITION:  THE REPORT OF THE 
BURBANK&WOLFF FINAL REVISED.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 11/18/2010  10:59 AM 
46 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 159: 17 
of staying alert to rulemaking or interpretation “in the guise of regu-
lating procedure.”129  Like Marek, they also suggest that “rules of deci-
sion” do not exhaust the universe of relevant substantive rights. 
In Justice Scalia’s plurality opinion in Shady Grove, he correctly de-
clined to make the validity of a Federal Rule turn on a particularistic 
and after-the-fact analysis of the policies underlying state law prescrip-
tions on the very matter that the Federal Rule covered.130  As one of us 
has previously observed in language very similar to Justice Scalia’s, 
that is a recipe for state laws of identical content, but animated by dif-
ferent policies, to render a Federal Rule “valid in one state and not in 
another, here today, gone tomorrow.”131  Apart from its erroneous at-
tention exclusively to state law, such an interpretation is hardly consis-
tent with the vision of uniform and simple Federal Rules that ani-
mated the movement that brought us the Enabling Act. 
Yet to say that a Federal Rule that was valid when promulgated 
(because reasonably thought not to make choices that predictably and 
directly affect rights under the substantive law) is forever after invul-
nerable to attack is neither necessary nor attractive as an alternative.  
Moreover, we part company with Justice Scalia when he extends his 
disdain for differential validity to the possibility of differential applica-
tion.132  That is, we believe that the application of a Federal Rule may 
 
THIRD CIRCUIT TASK FORCE ON FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 11, at 10-13, 35-36 
(Stephen B. Burbank rep., 1989) (criticizing the lower-court decisions). 
129 Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 10 (1941).  The same is true of the 1984 
proposal to amend Rule 68, where the rulemakers hoped that by calling the conse-
quences a sanction instead of fee shifting, they could avoid Enabling Act difficulties.  See 
Burbank, supra note 70, at 428-29 (“What is in a word?  A lot in this case, because that 
word carries with it baggage the rulemakers hope will insulate them from their critics.”). 
130  Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431, 1444 
(2010) (Scalia, J., for himself, Roberts, C.J., Thomas, J., and Sotomayor, J.). 
 The fundamental difficulty with both these arguments is that the substantive 
nature of New York’s law, or its substantive purpose, makes no difference.  A Fed-
eral Rule of Procedure is not valid in some jurisdictions and invalid in oth-
ers—or valid in some cases and invalid in others—depending upon whether 
its effect is to frustrate a state substantive law (or a state procedural law 
enacted for substantive purposes). 
Id. 
131 Burbank, supra note 5, at 1188. 
132 See Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1440-41 (majority opinion) (“[The dissent’s ap-
proach] would mean . . . that one State’s statute could survive pre-emption (and ac-
cordingly affect the procedures in federal court) while another State’s identical law 
would not, merely because its authors had different aspirations.”).  The extension is 
fainthearted because it is dependent on whether a Federal Rule is thought to be ambi-
guous.  See id. at 1442 n.7 (“[I]t is reasonable to assume that ‘Congress is just as con-
cerned as we have been to avoid significant differences between state and federal 
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vary not according to the putative policies underlying state law on the 
same matter, but rather according to the structure and operation of 
state law as it interacts with and is implemented by the litigation 
process.  Because schemes of substantive rights are not uniform, the 
respect for such schemes that the Enabling Act enjoins may require 
just such differential application. 
There are limits to human foresight when engaged in prospective 
lawmaking, particularly when the lawmaking in question is transsubs-
tantive.  Over time, as thinking about law, litigation, and civil law en-
forcement has evolved, so has our understanding of what it means to 
have legal rights.  We now better understand what in the legal land-
scape—in addition to rules defining rights and duties—determines 
whether citizens will be able to fructify their legal rights.  Federal and 
state choices regarding matters like attorneys’ fees, when designed to 
affect the existence or extent of the enforcement of legal rights and 
duties, should be protected against infringement by Federal Rules.  It 
is likely that those who promoted the bill that became the Enabling 
Act would have agreed.  As one of us previously noted in explaining 
why the 1984 proposal to amend Rule 68 presented serious Enabling 
Act questions, 
[T]here is evidence that those in Congress who drafted and gave serious 
attention to the bill that became the Enabling Act did not regard subs-
tantive law in this [i.e., Sibbach’s] sense as the only area to be avoided in 
or protected from supervisory court rulemaking.  The 1926 Senate Judi-
ciary Committee noted that “[s]ome of our most valued civil liberties 
have been obtained through the creation by legislative edict of mere re-
medial measures.”  In its view, the grant of rulemaking power did not ex-
tend to “matters involving substantive legal and remedial rights affected 
by the considerations of public policy.”  The Committee included in the 
category of remedial choices thus reserved for Congress [or the States] 
those that “define[] or limit[] . . . civil rights . . . using that term in the 
broad sense.”
133
 
The legislative history of the 1988 amendments is to the same effect.134 
 
courts in adjudicating claims.’  The assumption is irrelevant here, however, because 
there is only one reasonable reading of Rule 23.”) (quoting Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh 
Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 37-38 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting))). 
133 Burbank, supra note 70, at 433 (alterations in original) (quoting S. REP. NO. 69-
1174 at 9, 12 (1926)). 
134 The House Committee on the Judiciary reported that 
the substantive rights protected by proposed section 2072 include rights con-
ferred, or that might be conferred, by rules of substantive law, such as “the 
right not to be injured . . . by another’s negligence” or the right not to be sub-
ject to discrimination in employment on the basis of race.  Thus, the bill does 
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Bringing Sibbach into the twenty-first century need not lead to the 
replication of the “here today, gone tomorrow” problem that repelled 
Justice Scalia.  For just as the transsubstantive character of the Federal 
Rules limits the rulemakers’ ability to predict with confidence when 
the choices they make today might consequentially (i.e., not “inciden-
tally”) affect the enforcement of federal and state substantive law in 
the future, so too it contributes to the high level of generality of the 
rules themselves.  Many, if not most, of the Federal Rules are charters 
for discretionary decisionmaking, setting boundaries and leaving the 
actual choices to federal trial judges.  To that extent, they are only su-
perficially uniform and superficially transsubstantive.135  The uniformi-
ty at which the Enabling Act aims must be measured in pragmatic 
terms, neither fatally undermined by an approach that focuses on pol-
icies underlying state law on the same issue, nor cemented by jingo-
istic dogma heedless of the evolving realities of court rulemaking and 
litigation practice—the fatal flaw of Justice Scalia’s opinion for the ma-
jority in Shady Grove, as we discuss in Part III. 
Unless a Federal Rule alleged to violate the Enabling Act actually 
makes a policy choice that Congress has had an opportunity to review 
(and since the 1980s, that would have been the subject of an elabo-
rate, multistage process involving notice, the opportunity for com-
ment, and other requirements designed to enhance transparency and 
accountability),136 the role that federal common law plays in providing 
 
not confer power on the Supreme Court to promulgate rules regarding mat-
ters, such as limitations and preclusion, that necessarily and obviously define 
or limit rights under the substantive law.  The protection extends beyond 
rules of substantive law, narrowly defined, however.  At the least, it also pre-
vents the application of rules, otherwise valid, where such rules would have 
the effect of altering existing remedial rights conferred as an integral part of 
the applicable substantive law scheme, federal or state, such as arrangements 
for attorney’s fees under 42 U.S.C. 1988. 
H.R. REP. NO. 99-422, at 21-22 (1985) (footnotes omitted); see also Burbank, Hold the 
Corks, supra note 12, at 1032-33 (citing the legislative history of the 1988 amendments). 
135  See Burbank, Rules and Discretion, supra note 12, at 716. 
 If one admits that only a lawyer can think about procedure and substantive 
law as if they were distinct preserves, that modern federal procedure is com-
plex and in large measure unpredictable, and that the Federal Rules are in 
similar measure only superficially uniform and trans-substantive, alternative 
reform strategies appear in sharper focus. 
Id. 
136 See generally Catherine T. Struve, The Paradox of Delegation:   Interpreting the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1099, 1102 (2002) (“Congress’s delega-
tion of rulemaking authority should constrain, rather than liberate, courts’ interpre-
tation of the Rules.”). 
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content that the rulemakers did not prospectively entertain should be 
recognized and analyzed accordingly.  Thus, the Gasperini Court was 
right in refusing, and Justice Scalia was quite wrong in seeking, to assi-
milate to Rule 59 a policy choice that its drafters did not make and that 
federal common law could not make for state law diversity cases.137 
In urging resort to federal common law as a means to discipline, 
by testing the validity of, policy choices sought to be imputed to Fed-
eral Rules which do not clearly make them,138 we hasten to add that we 
are not speaking of the unifocal, hypothetical federal common law as-
sociated with Hanna’s dictum, Walker, and subsequent cases that have 
found Federal Rules not to apply.  One of the costs of Hanna has been 
to discourage rigorous thinking about the relationship between Fed-
eral Rules and federal common law.  Alternatively, sloppy thinking 
about that relationship has contributed to the degraded state of Han-
na jurisprudence.  Byrd was undoubtedly imperfect, but it was correct 
when it said that one must consider “affirmative countervailing con-
siderations,”139 properly conceived, in determining whether federal 
common law may validly be applied. 
Rule 23 was not the source of the limitations-tolling rule that the 
Court announced in American Pipe & Construction Co. v. Utah140 nor of 
 
137 See Burbank, supra note 70, at 437 (“When a Federal Rule confers substantial 
discretion on the trial judge, it is hard to understand why an exercise of that discretion 
should not be required to be consistent with federal statutes—that is treated like fed-
eral common law.”); see also Burbank, supra note 5, at 1193 & nn.762-63 (describing the 
“lawmaking choices” related to the Federal Rules).  For a somewhat similar approach, 
which in our view does not deploy an adequately robust concept of federal common 
law, see Adam N. Steinman, What Is the Erie Doctrine? (and What Does It Mean for the Con-
temporary Politics of Judicial Federalism?), 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 245 (2008).  See also id. 
at 282-87, 297-301 (treating aspects of pleading, summary judgment, and class certifica-
tion as “unguided Erie choices”); Lucas Watkins, How States Can Protect Their Policies in 
Federal Class Actions, 32 CAMPBELL L. REV. 285, 297-98 (2010) (“Because [interpretive] 
results are not dictated by the Federal Rules, but rather by judicial gloss, they should 
not be protected by the Rules’ presumption of validity.  Instead, federal interpretations 
of Rule 23 should be treated as an ‘unguided Erie choice between state and federal 
law.’” (footnotes omitted) (quoting Steinman, supra, at 287)).  
138 Cf. Struve, supra note 136, at 1102 (arguing that consideration of all of the as-
pects of the post-1980s Enabling Act process suggests less, rather than greater, freedom 
in interpreting the Federal Rules). 
139 Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., Inc., 356 U.S. 525, 537 (1958); see also supra 
note 62. 
140 414 U.S. 538 (1974). 
Even though Rule 23 does not and could not validly provide a tolling rule, in 
devising such a rule “not inconsistent with the legislative purpose,” the Court 
was not required to ignore the policies exogenous to limitations that animate 
Rule 23, including in particular the policy against “multiplicity of activity.” 
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the rule of preclusion that it announced in Cooper v. Federal Reserve 
Bank of Richmond.141  Rather, the application of Rule 23 in those pro-
ceedings was the occasion for the Court to implement class action pol-
icies in federal common law that it was otherwise authorized to make.  
Whether the same policies would suffice with respect to either ques-
tion to justify a federal judge-made rule different from a state rule in a 
state law diversity case is a difficult question.  The same is true, as 
another example, of the question whether Rule 13(a) can be used to 
support the application of a federal common law rule of preclusion, 
waiver, or estoppel to a defendant’s failure to assert a transactionally 
related counterclaim in federal diversity litigation when the state in 
which the court sits imposes no such requirement.  Using Rule 13(a) 
in that manner would presumably need to be justified by its non-
preclusion policies, such as the quest for enhanced accuracy in the 
resolution of related claims.142 
Using federal common law “to discipline, by testing the validity of, 
policy choices sought to be imputed to Federal Rules which do not 
clearly make them”143 is one way to make sense of the Hanna Court’s 
observation that “a court, in measuring a Federal Rule against the 
standards contained in the Enabling Act and the Constitution, need 
not wholly blind itself to the degree to which the Rule makes the cha-
racter and result of the federal litigation stray from the course it 
would follow in state courts.”144  It also would make sense, without in-
 
Burbank, Hold the Corks, supra note 12, at 1027-28 (footnotes omitted) (quoting Am. 
Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 551 (1974)). 
141 467 U.S. 867 (1984); see also Burbank, Interjurisdictional Preclusion, supra note 12, 
at 773 (“In authorizing the Court to promulgate Federal Rules, Congress must have 
contemplated that the federal courts would interpret them, fill their interstices, and, 
when necessary, ensure that their provisions were not frustrated by other legal rules.”). 
142 See Burbank, Interjurisdictional Preclusion, supra note 12, at 774 n.195 (noting 
that Rule 13(a) “might be animated by procedural purposes within the contemplation 
of the Rules Enabling Act”); id. at 772-73, 782 (noting that Rule 13 does not “provide a 
rule of preclusion” and describing the Rule’s origins); see also id. at 782-83 & n.242 
(discussing penalty dismissals under Rule 41(b), as to which “there is a federal interest 
relating solely to the initial litigation that justifies a federal [judge-made] rule”); Ste-
phen B. Burbank, Where’s the Beef?  The Interjurisdictional Effects of New Jersey’s Entire Con-
troversy Doctrine, 28 RUTGERS L.J. 87, 115-16 (1996) (exploring whether the “federal in-
terests [underlying Rule 19] are sufficiently important, and the threat to those 
interests sufficiently plausible, to justify the displacement of” New Jersey’s entire-
controversy doctrine, which, if applicable, would prompt joinder in situations not re-
quired by Rule 19). 
143 See supra text accompanying note 138. 
144 Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 473 (1965).  This interpretation reads “in mea-
suring a Federal Rule” to mean “in determining the scope of a Federal Rule.”  “This 
comment, however, cannot seriously be interpreted to import an outcome determina-
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terpretive gymnastics, of the otherwise puzzling invocation of “the fe-
deralism principle of Erie” in Justice Scalia’s opinion for the Court in 
Semtek,145 where, however, only such gymnastics could save Rule 41(b) 
from invalidity.  Very occasionally it will be necessary to swallow mis-
placed pride, accept that a Federal Rule has made a forbidden policy 
choice, invalidate it, and move on.146  If, however, the version of feder-
al common law employed does not focus exclusively on the incentives 
or perceptions that differences in outcome create, this approach to 
the interpretation of Federal Rules should usually implement the im-
portant insight of Professor Cover about what it means to have trans-
substantive rules of procedure.147 
Even though Justice Scalia’s interpretation of the Enabling Act did 
not command a majority in Shady Grove, some of his approach is faith-
ful to the original understanding.  In particular, his insistence on a 
test for validity that does not depend on idiosyncratic aspects of state 
law rings true for a statute that was designed primarily to allocate fed-
eral lawmaking power ex ante, rather than to protect policy choices 
(let alone only state law policies) ex post.  Laws that are idiosyncratic 
in one historical period, however, may become the norm in another.  
In addition, whether or not the traditional account of the relationship 
between formalism and realism is correct, the Sibbach Court analyzed 
the Enabling Act, as the original Advisory Committee justified its work, 
in monolithic dichotomous terms that no longer ring true (if they ever 
did).  Even Congress has learned the power of procedure and knows 
how to pursue or mask substantive aims in procedural dress.148 
 
tive test of the Guaranty Trust variety into the Enabling Act given the Court’s other re-
marks, and if it does not do that, it is not clear what the Court had in mind.”  Whitten, 
supra note 56, at 16-17 n.83. 
145 Semtek Int’l, Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497, 504 (2001); see also 
supra text accompanying notes 102-06 (discussing Semtek). 
146 See Burbank, supra note 106, at 1047 (“It might have been better, after all, to 
decide the Enabling Act question.”). 
147 See Robert M. Cover, For James Wm. Moore:  Some Reflections on a Reading of the 
Rules, 84 YALE L.J. 718, 735 (1975) (advocating reading the Enabling Act “to mean that 
the courts, in applying the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure . . . may not forsake their 
responsibility to justify substantive impact in terms of substantive values [so that] [i]t 
would not be enough to point to Rule 23; one would have to justify invoking it”). 
148 See Stephen B. Burbank, Procedure, Politics and Power:  The Role of Congress, 79 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1677, 1726 (2004).   
The specific experience of the proposed Evidence Rules and a new juris-
prudential climate combined to make members of Congress and their staffs 
aware of the potential of rulemaking choices to submerge substantive in favor 
of procedural policies, of supervisory court rulemaking to impinge on Con-
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For both reasons, there is greater reason for anxiety today than 
there was in 1941 about an interpretation of delegated legislative 
power that reads language of limitation out of the statute.  It is no 
surprise that the Court has ignored the attempt in 1988 to provide a 
standard more faithful to both the original understanding and evolv-
ing needs, both because the Court does not easily accept imposed li-
mitations on its own power and because the attempt was confined to 
legislative history.  Yet acknowledging that reasonable minds can dif-
fer about what the standard for the validity of a Federal Rule under 
the Enabling Act should be—albeit not about the primary goal of the 
allocation scheme employed—we hope to have made clear the need 
for moderate and restrained interpretation of Federal Rules that oth-
erwise would impinge on the freedom of Congress or the States to 
pursue lawmaking aims that might traditionally be characterized as 
substantive through means that one might traditionally characterize as 
procedural.149  The key to that approach is a nuanced appreciation of 
Federal Rules—one that, in the absence of express policy choices, re-
solves questions of scope by paying attention to what federal common 
law might achieve if the court could consider, in addition to outcome 
and the twin aims of Erie, federal policies demonstrably rooted in 
sources of unquestioned validity, including the Constitution, federal 
statutes, and Federal Rules.150 
 
gress’s lawmaking prerogatives, and of procedure consequentially to affect 
substantive rights. 
Id.  Likewise,  
for those many matters where the Federal Rules make no choices, leaving the 
procedure/substance accommodation to discretionary decisionmaking, the 
claim must be that Congress’s substantive agenda is always better served by 
trusting to the discretion of federal judges and thus abjuring the potentially 
potent technique of using procedure to drive, or to mask, substance.   
Id. at 1731-32. 
149 See Daily Income Fund, Inc. v. Fox, 464 U.S. 523, 544 n.2 (1984) (Stevens, J., 
concurring in the judgment) (stating that a demand requirement in shareholder de-
rivative litigation, “designed to improve corporate governance, is one of substantive 
law,” and because Rule 23.1 “does not clearly create such a substantive requirement by 
its express terms, it should not be lightly construed to do so and thereby alter substan-
tive rights”); see also Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Servs., Inc., 500 U.S. 90, 96-97 (1991) (cit-
ing Justice Stevens’s concurrence in Daily Income Fund with approval). 
150 “[T]he major obstacle to the development of principled guides to decision is 
the articulation of processes by which the competing policies are identified and deci-
sional weight attached to them.”  Burbank, Interjurisdictional Preclusion, supra note 12, at 
789.  In our view, “[f]ederal courts are not free to conjure up ‘interests’; rather, they 
must tie them to policies already articulated in, or at least articulable from, valid legal 
prescriptions.”  Id. at 789-90.  
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III. RECAPTURING THE ROLE OF LIABILITY AND REGULATORY  
POLICY IN AGGREGATE LITIGATION 
A. Federal Rule 23 
The dynamic process of interpretation that we describe above, 
and that we believe is necessary for the sensible and faithful interpre-
tation of rules promulgated under the limited delegation of authority 
that the Enabling Act contains, is hardly new.  In fact, it provides an 
apt vocabulary for describing the terms of the debate that surrounded 
the promulgation of the 1966 revisions to Rule 23, as well as some of 
the calls for reform that followed those revisions.  The tension be-
tween the potential for aggregate litigation to transform liability policy 
and the limited mandate of the Federal Rules has been one of the 
dominant themes in many discussions of the class action device.  So 
too has an understanding that rigid formal categories are inadequate, 
indeed counterproductive, when one seeks to describe and justify the 
permissible bounds of a class action proceeding and the binding ef-
fect of a resulting judgment.  That history makes all the more remark-
able Justice Scalia’s opinion for the majority in Shady Grove, which dis-
regards the lessons of history and the realities of the present in favor 
of a formalistic description of the class action as nothing more than a 
joinder rule like any other. 
The 1966 revisions to Rule 23 were preceded by a decades-long de-
bate that centered largely on the binding or preclusive effect of the 
judgment a class proceeding produces, along with the manner in which 
the nature of the rights being asserted shaped that binding effect.  As 
Professors Hazard, Geded, and Sowle have explained in detail, the 
modern class action had its origins in equity practice, which developed 
specialized proceedings for specific types of substantive actions that 
would allow a court to adjudicate claims affecting multiple parties de-
spite the absence of some parties from the proceeding.151  In the termi-
nology associated with original Rule 23, the “true” class action was avail-
able to resolve rights deemed joint or common among class members, 
the “hybrid” action permitted the resolution of claims that were several 
in nature but respected a specific res or common property interest, and 
the disfavored “spurious” class action described proceedings in which 
class members possessed rights that were several in nature and not li-
mited to a specific res but that nonetheless shared common issues of 
 
151 See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., John Geded & Stephen Sowle, The Binding Effect of 
Class Suits, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 1849 (1998).  
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law or fact and a common request for relief.152  In each case, the puta-
tive nature of the right at issue—a characterization that was often con-
tested—determined the potential availability of expansive joinder and, 
an importantly distinct question, the potential for the judgment result-
ing from the proceeding to bind all class members.153 
As originally drafted, Rule 23 sought to accommodate this tax-
onomy, setting forth a mechanism that enabled claimants to initiate a 
class proceeding in one of three categories that broadly tracked exist-
ing equity doctrine and explicitly tied the availability of a class pro-
ceeding to the “character of the right sought to be enforced”154 while 
providing little additional guidance about how to administer the pro-
ceeding once it was underway.  The Rule did not purport to define 
the “character of the right” that claimants possessed, of course—a 
matter that self-evidently fell outside the mandate of the Enabling Act.  
Neither did the Rule purport to define the binding or preclusive ef-
fect that would result from the judgment, a matter that was a more ac-
tive topic of discussion.  Professor Moore, the drafter of the 1938 
Rule, had proposed including a subsection entitled “Effect of Judg-
ment” that would have locked in place the prevailing doctrine on the 
respective preclusion rules applicable in each of the established cate-
gories of class proceeding.155  The different treatment of preclusion 
law among these categories was significant.  As Professor Kaplan has 
explained, Moore’s proposal would have “declar[ed] that the judg-
ment in true actions was conclusive on the class; in hybrid actions, 
conclusive upon the appearing parties and upon all claims whether or 
not presented insofar as they affected the property; and in spurious 
actions, conclusive only upon the appearing parties.”156  But the Advi-
sory Committee on Civil Rules rejected the suggestion, believing that 
the power to specify the binding effect of a class judgment upon ab-
 
152 Id. at 1937-39. 
153 See Tobias Barrington Wolff, Tribute, Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., and the Lessons of 
History, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 1323, 1324-25 (2010) (noting the separate “provenance and 
. . . evolutionary path” of these distinct doctrines and the importance of Hazard et al.’s 
work in clarifying that history).  The potential for “one way” spurious classes, in which 
class members could sit out the proceedings and wait to see the outcome, only choos-
ing to appear and be bound if the result was favorable, was the focus of some of the 
most intense scrutiny.  See Hazard et al., supra note 151, at 1857. 
154 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(1)–(3) (1938).   
155 See James Wm. Moore, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure:  Some Problems Raised by the 
Preliminary Draft, 25 GEO. L.J. 551, 570-76 (1937) (discussing the rejection of his “Effect 
of Judgment” proposal). 
156 Benjamin Kaplan, Continuing Work of the Civil Committee:  1966 Amendments of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (I), 81 HARV. L. REV. 356, 377-78 (1967) (footnotes omitted). 
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sentees exceeded their mandate:  “The Committee consider it beyond 
their functions to deal with the question of the effect of judgments on 
persons who are not parties.”157  Professor Moore instead included his 
account of the binding effect of class proceedings in his influential 
treatise, which went on to shape the development of federal common 
law in the area.158 
As class action practice developed in the decades that followed, 
this rigid formulation of original Rule 23 was predictably constraining.  
By limiting the availability of the class action mechanism to cases in-
volving specific categories of rights, the Rule pressured courts to con-
form their substantive analysis to those categories, and the abstract na-
ture of the categories prevented the resulting doctrine from 
cohering.159  This, combined with the Rule’s lack of guidance regard-
ing the administration of class proceedings, caused the class action 
device to “become snarled,”160 leading the Advisory Committee to con-
clude that a reformulation was in order.  Among the lessons that were 
apparent following the drafters’ first effort was “that right answers 
should not depend on the mere preservation of the categories or ter-
minology of rule 23, but rather on the play of the intrinsic policies.”161 
When the Advisory Committee undertook to reformulate Rule 23 
and produced the basic framework under which the Rule now oper-
ates, two opposing forces—the limits of the Enabling Act and the 
demonstrated ability of this powerful Rule to shape underlying doc-
 
157 ADVISORY COMM. ON RULES FOR CIVIL PROCEDURE, PROPOSED RULES OF CIVIL 
PROCEDURE FOR THE DISTRICT COURTS 60 (1937), reprinted in Kaplan, supra note 156, 
at 378 & n.79. 
158 See, e.g., 2 JAMES WM. MOORE, MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE ¶ 23.07 (1st ed. 
1938) (recounting the Advisory Committee’s refusal to include an “Effect of Judg-
ment” section and offering an approving summary of the current state of the law on 
the binding effects of different class proceedings); 3B JAMES WM. MOORE, MOORE’S 
FEDERAL PRACTICE ¶ 23.11 (2d ed. 1948 & 1974 Supp.) (offering a more mollified ac-
count of the Advisory Committee proceedings and summarizing caselaw on the bind-
ing effects of different class proceedings under original Rule 23).  
 As Professor Chafee put it: 
Nowise discouraged at being thus locked out at the front door, Mr. Moore 
soon contrived to slip in by the back door. . . . So great is the deserved respect 
for his treatise, that his scheme about binding outsiders has had almost as 
much influence upon judges as if it had been embodied in Rule 23. 
ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, JR., SOME PROBLEMS OF EQUITY 251 (1950); see also Kaplan, supra 
note 156, at 378-79 & n.82 (noting the influence of Moore’s work on the Committee). 
159 See Kaplan, supra note 156, at 380-86 (discussing different courts’ various inter-
pretations of the categories). 
160 Id. at 385. 
161 Id. at 384. 
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trine—occupied a prominent position in their efforts.  Professor Kap-
lan, who served as the Reporter to the Committee, captures this shift-
ing balance when describing the changes that the 1966 revision 
worked in the structure and operation of the Rule: 
It is implicit in what has been said that the anomaly of a class action cov-
ering only the particular parties does not survive under the new rule.  
Subdivision (c)(2) makes clear that the judgment in any class action 
maintained as such extends to the [entire] class (excluding opters-out in 
(b)(3) cases), whether or not favorable to the class.  This is a statement of 
how the judgment shall read, not an attempted prescription of its subsequent res 
judicata effect, although looking ahead with hope to that effect.
162
 
The constraints of the old Rule had limited the effectiveness of the 
class action device.  Those limits flowed from the form of substantive 
rights for which the Rule authorized enforcement, not from any defi-
nition of the content of those rights or of the preclusive consequences 
of litigating them in an aggregate proceeding prescribed by the Rule 
itself.  But their effect was still significant.  In seeking to sweep away 
those constraints and respond to “the insistent need to improve the 
methods of handling litigation affecting groups,”163 the Committee 
sought to benefit from this same dynamic tension.  It restructured the 
Rule in a manner that relied on corresponding alterations in the law 
of preclusion, disclaiming any power to effectuate those changes itself 
but “hop[ing]”164—one might say expecting—that subsequent courts 
pronouncing on the underlying law would follow suit. 
The Committee’s approach to Rule 23(b)(3) and the require-
ments of diversity jurisdiction evinces this same tension between the 
limits of the Enabling Act and the power of Federal Rules to shape or 
catalyze developments in the underlying law.  Under the old catego-
ries, jurisdiction over nondiverse absent class members in true or hy-
brid proceedings was justified on a theory of ancillary jurisdiction, but 
the spurious class action, which bound only parties who actually made 
an appearance, was ill suited for such treatment.  These old doctrines 
raised the question whether the new (b)(3) action, which made no 
exception for nondiverse absentees, would entail an extension of sub-
ject matter jurisdiction that would violate either Rule 82 (which pro-
hibits the extension of jurisdiction by rule) or the Enabling Act itself.  
Professor Kaplan notes this potential objection in his account of the 
Committee’s work but then dismisses it, invoking the active relation-
 
162 Id. at 393 (emphasis added). 
163 Id. at 394. 
164 Id. at 393. 
BURBANK&WOLFF FINAL REVISED.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 11/18/2010  10:59 AM 
2010] Missed Opportunities of Shady Grove 57 
ship between the Rules and the underlying law as the proper frame 
within which to address this question: 
[E]ven if one should accept dubious doctrine about the outworn spurious 
category as immovable law, it would not be decisive of problems under 
the new rule.  New rule 23 alters the pattern of class actions; subdivision 
(b)(3), in particular, is a new category deliberately created.  Like other 
innovations from time to time introduced into the Civil Rules, those as to 
class actions change the total situation on which the statutes and theories 
regarding subject matter jurisdiction are brought to bear.  From the start 
the Civil Rules, elaborating and complicating actions through joinder of 
claims and parties, have profoundly influenced jurisdictional re-
sult. . . . Not only must new rule 23 be considered a fresh datum for de-
ciding whether diversity of citizenship requirements are satisfied by the 
original parties or intervenors; it also presents a new complex in deciding 
questions of permissible “aggregation” of amounts in controversy.
165
 
The reformulated Rule did not purport to change jurisdictional poli-
cy, but it changed the landscape against which courts and legislatures 
must shape that policy. 
The implications of the revised Rule for the enforcement of im-
portant public norms were immediately apparent, particularly for 
Rule 23(b)(3).  Professor Kaplan’s predictions regarding the effect of 
the revisions on the underlying law were less prescient here than in 
the case of preclusion, however.  In several of its first major decisions 
on the revised Rule, the Supreme Court undercut the power of 
Rule 23 as a mechanism for enforcing small claims.  Although it reaf-
firmed the Cauble rule for measuring diversity in class actions accord-
ing to the citizenship of the named plaintiffs,166 the Court interpreted 
the diversity statute to prohibit aggregation167 or ancillary jurisdic-
tion168 as a means of satisfying the amount-in-controversy requirement, 
effectively removing the federal courts from the business of hearing 
small claims based on state law.169  And in Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 
the Court disapproved efforts by a district court to resolve practical 
 
165 Id. at 399-400 (footnotes omitted). 
166 See Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332, 340 (1969) (describing the rule of Supreme 
Tribe of Ben-Hur v. Cauble, 255 U.S. 356 (1921), as “current doctrine”). 
167 See id. at 338 (“[T]he 1966 changes in Rule 23 did not and could not have 
changed the interpretation of the statutory phrase ‘matter in controversy.’”).  
168 See Zahn v. Int’l Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291, 300 (1973) (holding that the Snyder 
rule requires dismissal of any plaintiff who fails to meet the jurisdictional amount), 
overruled by 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (2006), as recognized in Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah 
Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546 (2005). 
169 That state of affairs has changed since the enactment of the Class Action Fair-
ness Act of 2005.  See infra text accompanying notes 242-43. 
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obstacles in small-claim class actions brought under federal law, find-
ing that Rule 23 imposed a strict individual-notice requirement that 
prohibited reliance upon a sample-based approach and did not au-
thorize the imposition of notice costs upon the defendant.170 
Nonetheless, the power of the class action was being unleashed 
during this period, with attendant complaints about the quest for out-
sized fees by class counsel and the settlement pressure that large ex-
posure and discovery costs can impose upon defendants.171  The lobby-
ing of energized interest groups led Congress and the Advisory 
Committee to consider further adjustments.  In 1978, the Office for 
Improvements in the Administration of Justice of the Department of 
Justice completed a proposal recommending that Rule 23(b)(3) be 
replaced by a statutory mechanism that would provide greater access 
and accountability for small-claims actions, coupled with mechanisms 
for more government oversight in higher-stakes damages actions.  The 
proposal, reproduced in the Congressional Record in conjunction 
with a debate in the Senate Judiciary Committee, begins by setting 
forth the Justice Department’s view that “revision of class damage pro-
cedures should be accomplished by direct legislative enactment rather 
than through the rule-making process” because of “the perception 
that such revision would have a significant impact on public policy.”172  
It continues: 
The deterrence of widespread injury is of substantial public interest, and 
Congress should devote extensive consideration to any proposal.  Also, 
revision of class damage procedures would have significant economic 
ramifications, which raise serious questions as to whether such revision is 
 
170 See 417 U.S. 156, 173-79 (1974).  In Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 
340 (1978), the Court held that representative plaintiffs usually must pay the costs of 
identifying class members for notice purposes.  See id. at 359. 
171 See Developments in the Law—Class Actions, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1318, 1604-23 
(1976) (discussing the concern that class counsel were receiving “spectacularly large” 
fee awards and describing courts’ efforts to control those awards).  Although advocat-
ing invigoration of the spurious class action (in 1941) for purposes of private enforce-
ment, Kalven and Rosenfield noted that administrative enforcement had a number of 
advantages, in particular with respect to “much new social legislation,” where “the 
tempering of the enforcement of law by such discretion,” which they had defined as 
“consistent, coherent, politic application, . . . is of real importance.”  Harry Kalven, Jr. 
& Maurice Rosenfield, The Contemporary Function of the Class Suit, 8 U. CHI. L. REV. 684, 
719 (1941).  They continued, “No such restraint can be expected if the law is adminis-
tered through private litigation; rather, the method will result in an insistence upon 
the harshest results and the most technical interpretations.”  Id. 
172 124 CONG. REC. 27,860 (1978). 
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appropriately within the scope of the rule-making authority granted by 
the Rules Enabling Act.
173
 
The proposal suggests (1) replacing the small-claim damages class ac-
tion with a public action that aims exclusively at deterrence and vests 
the right of recovery directly in the government—a formal alteration 
of substantive rights that would unquestionably have exceeded the 
mandate of the rulemakers; and (2) restructuring class actions involv-
ing larger damages claims to improve efficiency and fairness of admin-
istration without sacrificing individual compensation.174 
As with the 1966 amendments, this ultimately unsuccessful push 
for reform had to grapple with the indefinite status of Rule 23 in rela-
tion to underlying substantive law.  That effort was not always enligh-
tening.  In his remarks introducing the proposal, for example, Sena-
tor DeConcini framed the issue by explaining that the “primary 
purpose” of a small-claims class action under Rule 23(b)(3) was “to 
prevent unjust enrichment and to deter illegal conduct rather than to 
compensate the injured parties,” whereas the “primary focus” in class 
litigation involving larger claims was “compensation of the parties.”175  
As a broad account of the policy goals that the underlying law will of-
ten want to see vindicated in such actions, these descriptions are apt.  
But the failure to clarify that it is the underlying law, and not Rule 23, 
that is the source of these policy priorities is unfortunate, particularly 
in an introduction to a proposal that focuses such explicit attention 
on that distinction. 
But Senator DeConcini is to be forgiven, for this failure to distin-
guish clearly between the class action mechanism and the policies of 
the underlying law that it helps to enforce is endemic.176  Judge Posn-
er’s much-noted opinion for the Seventh Circuit in In re Rhone-Poulenc 
Rorer Inc.177 is illustrative.  Rhone-Poulenc involved a proposed nation-
 
173 Id. 
174 Id. at 27,860-61. 
175 Id. at 27,859. 
176 See Burbank, supra note 23, at 1522 n.329. 
Recent scholarship has correctly noted the weakness of an agency-costs criti-
que when applied to negative-value class actions in which the main goal can 
plausibly be deemed deterrence rather than compensation. . . . In my view, 
however, those authors have not succeeded in articulating a principled me-
thod for determining when deterrence is plausibly deemed the main goal of 
litigation (which surely requires attention to the substantive-law scheme), or 
in suggesting means to prevent inefficient overenforcement. 
 Id. (citations omitted). 
177 51 F.3d 1293 (7th Cir. 1995). 
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wide class action filed on behalf of hemophiliacs who were accidental-
ly infected with HIV through their use of tainted blood products.178  A 
district court had certified a nationwide class encompassing all such 
individuals, limited to the issue of the defendant drug companies’ 
negligence in failing to detect the virus.179  There being no avenue at 
that time for immediate appellate review of certification orders,180 the 
defendants requested that the Seventh Circuit interrupt the proceed-
ings with a writ of mandamus.181  The majority granted the request for 
extraordinary relief and ordered that the issue class be decertified.182 
In explaining the reasons for rejecting the nationwide class, Judge 
Posner raised two concerns.  The first related to the impact of a class 
proceeding on the industry for manufactured blood products and the 
then-nascent state of negligence litigation on individually filed claims.  
By certifying a nationwide class, Judge Posner observed, the district 
court is “forcing these defendants to stake their companies on the 
outcome of a single jury trial” or else “to settle even if they have no le-
gal liability” for “fear of the risk of bankruptcy.”183  At the time, thir-
teen negligence cases had been litigated to verdict, with only one pro-
ducing a judgment for the plaintiffs.  Judge Posner opined that it 
would be preferable to defer industry-wide resolution of the liability 
question until “a decentralized process of multiple trials, involving dif-
ferent juries, and different standards of liability” was given the oppor-
tunity to produce a “consensus or maturing of judgment” on the ap-
propriate liability response to the tragedy that had befallen this 
population of claimants.184  Judge Posner did not tie these observa-
tions to any particular liability policies, instead seeming to offer them 
 
178 Id. at 1296. 
179 Id. at 1294-95, 1296-97.  This was an aggressive use of the authority Rule 
23(c)(4)(A) (now restyled as 23(c)(4)) grants to certify a class “with respect to particu-
lar issues.”  FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(4). 
180 Rule 23 was amended in 1998 to authorize appellate courts to review certifica-
tion decisions at their discretion.  See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(f). 
181 Rhone-Poulenc, 51 F.3d at 1294. 
182 Id. at 1304. 
183 Id. at 1299. 
184 Id. at 1299-1300.  It cannot have escaped Judge Posner’s notice that mass tort 
defendants typically devote careful attention to which cases are tried (and in what or-
der), settling those that they consider weak from a defense perspective.  This pheno-
menon casts in a somewhat different light the statistics adduced in Rhone-Poulenc.   
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as a statement about class action policy under Rule 23, which is how 
other courts have understood them.185 
The court’s second concern was the liability standard that would 
govern in a nationwide negligence action.  Choice-of-law principles 
might well call for the application of the negligence laws of fifty differ-
ent states, but the district court had concluded that it could harmonize 
these standards so as to produce a single instruction for the jury.186  In 
another memorable turn of phrase, Judge Posner disapproved such an 
“Esperanto instruction,” which he found tantamount to a rejection of 
Erie and a return to a general common law standard that would disre-
gard or erase differences among States about the nuances (and poten-
tially the core features) of negligence policy.187  For both these reasons, 
the court concluded, the class had to be decertified.188 
What is striking, for present purposes, is Judge Posner’s lack of at-
tention in the first part of his analysis to the policy differences that 
States might have regarding the “mature tort” problem and the rela-
tive merits of decentralized adjudication, which offers the benefit of 
accreted wisdom over time but may produce results that lack unifor-
mity and appear arbitrary, versus a high-stakes industry-wide trial, 
which creates greater risks of inaccurate or unreliable results but also 
provides greater parity and fairness among claimants.  There is no 
right answer to the question whether this is a matter of class action 
policy or liability policy.  It partakes of both—and the existence of a 
new and robust procedural mechanism for the adjudication of claims 
enables courts and legislatures to confront new questions of liability 
policy that had previously lain quiescent or gone wholly unad-
dressed.189  As Professor Cover has explained, 
 
185 See, e.g., Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 748-49 (5th Cir. 1996) 
(adopting Judge Posner’s treatment of “maturing” torts in rejecting proposed nation-
wide class action on behalf of all nicotine-dependent smokers). 
186 Rhone-Poulenc, 51 F.3d at 1300-02. 
187 Id. at 1300-01. 
188 Id. at 1300-02.  The court also raised Seventh Amendment concerns about the 
district court’s plan to bifurcate the trial of the common and individual issues, with 
separately empanelled juries deciding the latter as needed, suggesting that such a pro-
cedure might violate the Seventh Amendment’s Reexaminiation Clause.  Id. at 1302-
04.  That part of the court’s analysis, not germane here, is unconvincing.  See Tobias 
Barrington Wolff, Preclusion in Class Action Litigation, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 717, 776-82 
(2005) (critiquing Judge Posner’s reliance on the “sparse words” of the Reexamination 
Clause to limit successive class action suits as “simply not sustainable”). 
189 In this respect, our view differs from that of Professor Richard Nagareda, who 
appears to posit a more static relationship between class action practice and the under-
lying substantive law.  In his highly theorized account of these matters, Professor Naga-
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Federal Rule 23 presents a procedural possibility which, once present, 
cannot help but shape and articulate substantive law.  That shaping is as 
real if the opportunity is foregone as it is if the possibility is seized.  For a 
choice to forego is pregnant in a way that doing without can never be.
190
 
Judge Posner, too, reverted to Esperanto when providing guid-
ance on these matters. 
The history of Rule 23, then, entails a seventy-year-long discussion 
of the deeply intertwined relationship between the procedural me-
chanism that enables aggregation of large numbers of claims for adju-
dication and the capacity of that mechanism to ossify certain liability 
rules (in the case of original Rule 23) or to catalyze innovation in the 
liability policies of the underlying law (in the case of the post-1966 ver-
sion of the Rule, and particularly Rule 23(b)(3)).  The Court’s inatten-
tion to the Enabling Act implications of this powerful device during 
most of that time, including the proper construction of the Rule in 
light of those implications, has been surprising.  Before Shady Grove, 
the Court’s only substantial statement on the issue came in Ortiz v. 
Fibreboard, where it rejected an adventuresome use of Rule 23(b)(1)(B) 
that sought to aggregate individual personal-injury claims into a man-
datory class settlement on the theory that the total value of the defen-
dant’s insurance coverage and net worth could be treated as a “limited 
fund.”191  Vaguely gesturing toward “the tension between the limited 
fund class action’s pro rata distribution in equity and the rights of indi-
vidual tort victims at law,” the Court adopted a restrained interpreta-
tion of Rule 23(b)(1)(B) that hewed more closely to the historical an-
 
reda correctly distinguishes between the limited delegation of rulemaking authority 
contained in the Enabling Act and the role of politically accountable policymakers in 
defining the content and scope of enforceable rights.  See Richard A. Nagareda, The 
Preexistence Principle and the Structure of the Class Action, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 149, 181-98 
(2003).  As suggested by the name that he chooses for his theory, however, Professor 
Nagareda appears to conceptualize those rights as having a fixed status that is unrelated 
to the potential use of aggregation for enforcement.  See, e.g., id. at 197 (“The [preexis-
tence] principle prefers to respect the bundle of rights previously generated through 
processes in which there is a long run—flawed though that bundle might be—over the al-
ternatives that might be created through the one-shot, and thus more fallible, vehicle of 
private delegations by class action rule.”); see also id. (acknowledging the potential for 
this approach to produce “inaction”).  In so doing, we believe, Nagareda misses the dy-
namic nature of the relationship that has in fact existed between liability rules and the 
procedural and jurisdictional backdrop against which policymakers play those rules out. 
190 Cover, supra note 147, at 720; see also Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., The Effect of the 
Class Action Rule on the Substantive Law, 58 F.R.D. 307, 307 (1973) (“Substantive law is 
shaped and articulated by procedural possibilities.”). 
191 See Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 845 (1999). 
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tecedents mentioned in the Advisory Committee notes192—an unsatisfy-
ing analysis, but one that at least acknowledged the dynamic tension 
that has characterized the entire history of the Rule.193 
Read against this history, the Court’s treatment of the interplay 
between the Enabling Act and the proper interpretation of Rule 23 in 
Shady Grove exhibits a lack of sophistication that is difficult to fathom. 
First, Justice Scalia dismisses the proposition that a court should 
look to the policies embodied in the underlying substantive law when 
deciding whether class certification is appropriate, pointing to the 
language in Rule 23 providing that a class action “may be maintained” 
if the requirements of the Rule are satisfied: 
There is no reason . . . to read Rule 23 as addressing only whether claims 
made eligible for class treatment by some other law should be certified as 
class actions.  Allstate asserts that Rule 23 neither explicitly nor implicitly 
empowers a federal court “to certify a class in each and every case” where 
the Rule’s criteria are met.  But that is exactly what Rule 23 does:  It says 
that if the prescribed preconditions are satisfied “[a] class action may be 
maintained” (emphasis added)—not “a class action may be permitted.”  
Courts do not maintain actions; litigants do.  The discretion suggested by 
Rule 23’s “may” is discretion residing in the plaintiff:  He may bring his 
claim in a class action if he wishes.  And like the rest of the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure, Rule 23 automatically applies “in all civil actions and 
proceedings in the United States district courts.”
194
 
Notwithstanding Justice Scalia’s attempt to buttress his analysis 
through the aggressive use of italics for emphasis, there is ample reason 
to read Rule 23 as requiring attention to the question that the majori-
ty dismissed:  whether the use of the class action mechanism in a given 
case will promote or frustrate the substantive liability policies of the 
 
192 Id. at 845-48. 
193 Professor David Shapiro’s scholarly voice has been one of the most important 
in developing an advanced understanding of the relationship between the class action 
mechanism and the underlying substantive law.  Shapiro’s classic 1998 article offered a 
strong defense of an aggregate-litigation model that treats some claims as no longer 
the property of individual rights holders but rather the possession of an entity—the 
class—that should be the primary point of reference when thinking about questions of 
autonomy and agency in the litigation process.  See David L. Shapiro, Class Actions:  The 
Class as Party and Client, 73 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 913, 918-42 (1998).  In exploring the 
implications of this approach, Shapiro correctly concludes that the decisions involved 
in such a shift in paradigm must come from responsible policymakers, rather than 
Rule 23 itself.  See id. at 957 (“In my view, [Rule 23] should be framed in a way that 
does not place unreasonable roadblocks in the way of movement toward an entity 
model by responsible policymakers, nor should it impede recognition of the present 
force and effect of the model in the administration of class actions.”). 
194 Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431, 1438 
(2010) (citations omitted). 
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underlying law.  That question has in fact served as a constant counter-
point, both in the application and interpretation of the Rule and in 
discussions about reform.  As Justice Ginsburg noted in her dissent, 
“Palmer, Ragan, Cohen, Walker, Gasperini, and Semtek provide good reason 
to look to the law that creates the right to recover” in determining the 
proper scope and operation of a Federal Rule.195  In the case of Rule 23 
itself, the Court in Ortiz rejected the notion that certification was man-
datory whenever the Rule’s enumerated requirements were satisfied, 
explaining that “tension” between the application of the Rule and the 
goals of the underlying law, even if “acceptable under the Rules Enabl-
ing Act,” should nonetheless be “kept within tolerable limits” by offer-
ing a restrained interpretation of the Rule’s open-ended provisions.196 
Justice Scalia, however, refused even to acknowledge the existence 
of such tension in Shady Grove.  Speaking for the four-Justice plurality, 
he characterized Rule 23 as nothing more than a claims-processing 
mechanism, requiring no more attention under the Enabling Act than 
any other joinder rule.  “A class action, no less than traditional joind-
er,” he wrote, “merely enables a federal court to adjudicate claims of 
multiple parties at once, instead of in separate suits.  And like tradi-
tional joinder, it leaves the parties’ legal rights and duties intact and 
the rules of decision unchanged.”197  Justice Scalia likewise dismissed 
the impact of class certification on the defendant’s exposure to liabili-
ty with another formalistic account of aggregate litigation: 
Allstate contends that . . . [a]llowing Shady Grove to sue on behalf of a 
class “transform[s] [the] dispute over a five hundred dollar penalty into a 
dispute over a five million dollar penalty.”  Allstate’s aggregate liability, 
however, does not depend on whether the suit proceeds as a class action.  
Each of the 1,000-plus members of the putative class could . . . bring a 
freestanding suit asserting his individual claim.  It is undoubtedly true 
that some plaintiffs who would not bring individual suits for the relative-
ly small sums involved will choose to join a class action.  That has no 
bearing, however, on Allstate’s or the plaintiffs’ legal rights.
198
 
Rather, Justice Scalia asserts, “[t]he likelihood that some (even many) 
plaintiffs will be induced to sue by the availability of a class action is 
just the sort of ‘incidental effec[t]’ we have long held does not violate 
 
195 Id. at 1468 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
196 Ortiz, 527 U.S. at 845. 
197 Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1443 (Scalia, J., for himself, Roberts, C.J., Thomas, J., 
and Sotomayor, J.). 
198 Id. (citation omitted). 
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§ 2072(b).”199  Nowhere in any part of his opinion, either for the ma-
jority or the plurality, does Justice Scalia even mention the monumen-
tal pressure that class certification imposes on defendants to settle—a 
dominant factor in the practical dynamics of class litigation200—or the 
decades of effort by courts, including the Supreme Court itself in Or-
tiz, to shape class action practice to avoid compromising important 
policies bound up in the substantive law. 
What is one to make of this performance?  The most charitable in-
terpretation, we think, is that the majority simply could not see a way 
to uphold the facial validity of Rule 23 while at the same time ac-
knowledging the industry-changing impact of class action practice.  
But describing Rule 23 as a prosaic joinder provision whose expansion 
of liability exposure is merely an “incidental effect” does not describe 
reality, and we should not pretend otherwise.201  The legislative history 
and statutory findings that undergird the Class Action Fairness Act of 
2005 certainly represent Congress’s repudiation of that proposition, 
whatever else one might say about them.202 
Less charitably, Justice Scalia and others who joined his opinion 
may have been methodologically hostile to the more textured mode 
of analysis required to harmonize Rule 23 with the Enabling Act—one 
that rejects dogmatic adherence to transsubstantive procedure and 
 
199 Id.  But cf. Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 617 (1997) (“‘The pol-
icy at the very core of the class action mechanism is to overcome the problem that small 
recoveries do not provide the incentive for any individual to bring a solo action prose-
cuting his or her rights.’” (quoting Mace v. Van Ru Credit Corp., 109 F.3d 338, 344 (7th 
Cir. 1997))).  Since Amchem found that the settlement class action before it stood in vi-
olation of Rule 23, the Court was not required to offer a careful analysis of the origins of 
this policy preference.   Justice Ginsburg’s reference to the “class action mechanism,” see 
Amchem, 521 U.S. at 617, suggests a lack of precision in that regard—this incentive prob-
lem is one that the underlying substantive law must address, not Rule 23. 
200 Even Justice Ginsburg—in whose dissent we find much to admire—only men-
tions settlement once, in two brief sentences in a footnote.  See Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 
1465 n.3 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“A court’s decision to certify a class accordingly plac-
es pressure on the defendant to settle even unmeritorious claims.  When representative 
plaintiffs seek statutory damages, pressure to settle may be heightened because a class 
action poses the risk of massive liability unmoored to actual injury.” (citation omitted)). 
201 Cf. Tobias Barrington Wolff, Federal Jurisdiction and Due Process in the Era of the 
Nationwide Class Action, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 2035, 2086-94 (2008) (describing the Court’s 
unrealistic treatment of the opt-out procedure in Phillips Petroleum v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 
797 (1985), and the doctrinal distortions that it has produced). 
202 See Burbank, supra note 23, 1444 n.12 (discussing the 2005 Senate Report on 
the Class Action Fairness Act and reactions of courts and commentators); Wolff, supra 
note 201, at 2038-40 & nn.6-9 (discussing factual findings in the Class Action Fairness 
Act concerning the impact of class action litigation on industry and public policy); see 
also S. REP. NO. 109-14 (2005), reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3. 
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the allure of artificially crisp formalisms, recognizing instead the di-
alectic relationship that necessarily exists between the prospective in-
tentions of rulemakers and the actual application of open-textured 
provisions over time.203  Such a mode of analysis would have produced 
a very different result in Shady Grove. 
Rule 23 empowers federal courts to construct representative pro-
ceedings that bind absent class members on the promise of adequate 
representation and other important “procedural protections.”204  Con-
trary to Justice Scalia’s dismissive view, authorizing such a proceeding 
bears directly upon liability policy when it radically alters the levels of 
enforcement of public norms.  Discussing standing cases, for example, 
Professor Cover put the point this way: 
The conferral of rights of participation upon those whose interest is re-
mote or, in a sense, gratuitous, must represent in large part a judgment 
about the likelihood of a particular form of litigation taking place without 
such participation, and about the desirability of encouraging such litiga-
tion. . . . One might wish to encourage litigation in order to deter a certain 
kind of conduct (by structuring litigation risks and making adverse results 
more likely) or in order to protect a certain class of persons considered 
particularly vulnerable to some specified form of predatory conduct.
205
 
These are judgments, Cover explained, that “must be made on an in-
dividual basis for each substantive question.”206 
The proximity of class action litigation to matters of such substan-
tive moment need not pose a threat under the Enabling Act, unless one 
views Rule 23 itself as the source of all such policy judgments.  Manifest-
ly, it cannot be.  But the unleashing of a powerful new procedural me-
chanism can serve as the occasion for substantive innovation through 
the common law process.207  Again Professor Cover captures this dynam-
 
203 This species of sensible pragmatism is a hallmark of Justice Ginsburg’s work in 
procedure and related fields.  See generally Tobias Barrington Wolff, Ruth Bader Ginsburg 
and Sensible Pragmatism in Federal Jurisdictional Policy, 70 OHIO ST. L.J. 839 (2009). 
204 See Taylor v. Sturgell, 128 S. Ct. 2161, 2176 (2008) (describing conditions ne-
cessary for a representative proceeding to be binding on absent parties). 
205 Cover, supra note 147, at 728. 
206 Id. 
207 The historical record reflects that the drafters of Rule 23 viewed the possibility 
that the Rule would catalyze substantive innovation as both inevitable and desirable. 
There has been much debate about the goals of the drafters of Rule 
23(b)(3).  Study of the published and unpublished material relating to their 
work persuades me that, although they did not foresee, and could not have 
foreseen, all of the effects of this change, they were aware that they were 
breaking new ground and that those effects might be substantial.  Seeking to 
ensure that members of a class would be bound by an adverse judgment as 
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ic relationship with characteristic grace:  “As part of the repository of 
our collective procedural imagination the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure would be read to include remedial structures which could be ap-
plied where appropriate in light of substantive objectives.”208 
When the underlying law is federal, the role of federal judges in 
shaping the relationship between remedial structures and substantive 
policy objectives is unproblematic:  it is coextensive with their role as 
expositors of federal common law.209  When state liability policies go-
vern the proceeding, however, the common law role of the federal ju-
diciary has a different character.  A federal court’s task in a diversity 
class action is to determine the content of the applicable state law 
concerning the impact and desirability of an aggregate remedy on lia-
bility and regulatory goals.  In many cases, the courts and legislature 
of a state will not have had occasion to offer guidance about such 
questions.  Where that is so, a federal court must necessarily rely upon 
its best judgment—informed by a combination of existing statements 
of state liability policy and general principles of class adjudication—as 
to the direction in which state authorities would move the law.210  
Judge Posner’s “Esperanto” assertions in Rhone-Poulenc about the dan-
 
well as benefit from one that was favorable, the drafters recognized that Rule 
23(b)(3) would enable those with small claims for whom individual litigation 
would be economically irrational to band together in group litigation against 
a common adversary. 
Burbank, supra note 23, at 1487 (footnotes omitted).  But cf. Richard Marcus, Exceptio-
nalism and Convergence:  Form Versus Content and Categorical Views of Procedure, 49 SUP. CT. 
L. REV. (2d ser.) 521, 532 (2010) (“The 1966 revision of the federal class action rule 
was intended, in large measure, to empower the courts to implement an aggressive 
strategy of social change through litigation.” (footnote omitted)). 
208 Cover, supra note 147, at 735. 
209 Even in such a case, being clear about whether the Federal Rule or the underly-
ing federal law drives a rule of decision is still of great importance, as recent develop-
ments in the law of pleading amply demonstrate.  Compare Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 
550 U.S. 544, 554-57 (2007) (introducing a “plausibility” standard into the law of 
pleading in an antitrust dispute and leaving some doubt as to whether that standard 
would apply with equal force in other legal contexts), with Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 
1937 (2009) (holding that the new “plausibility” standard applies to all complaints go-
verned by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8).  Indeed, Iqbal itself could have—and 
perhaps should have—been decided on the basis that the federal common law of offi-
cial immunity required a stricter pleading standard.  See Stephen B. Burbank, Pleading 
and the Dilemmas of “General Rules,” 2009 WIS. L. REV. 535, 555-56, 558.   
 For a fascinating account of the Rule 23(b)(2) class action that demonstrates the 
extent to which its drafters were seeking to advance the goals of the emerging federal 
substantive law of desegregation, see David Marcus, Flawed but Noble:  Desegregation Liti-
gation and Its Implications for the Modern Class Action, 63 FLA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2011).   
210 See Salve Regina Coll. v. Russell, 499 U.S. 225, 231-32 (1991) (offering guidance 
to diversity courts in determining the content of state law). 
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ger of adjudicating an immature tort in a nationwide class action were 
not misplaced; they were simply incomplete.211 
But when state law does contain a clear statement of the circum-
stances in which an aggregate remedy is or is not consistent with the 
applicable liability or regulatory policies, that statement has the same 
controlling effect as the liability rule itself.  Such was the situation 
confronting the Shady Grove Court under section 901(b) of the New 
York Civil Practice Law and Rules. 
B. Section 901(b) 
The sequence of events associated with the enactment of section 
901(b) paints a remarkably clear picture of the purpose of that statute 
and the position that it occupied in the law of aggregate liability in 
New York.  Prior to 1975, the class action was nearly absent as a tool in 
New York’s judicial machinery.  The statute that preceded section 
901(a) (New York’s current general class action provision), section 
1005, said the following (and only the following) regarding when an 
aggregate representative proceeding was authorized: 
(a) When allowed.  Where the question is one of a common or general 
interest of many persons or where the persons who might be made par-
ties are very numerous and it may be impracticable to bring them all be-
fore the court, one or more may sue or defend for the benefit of all.
212
 
The courts of New York had interpreted this provision restrictively, 
holding that damages class actions were generally available only in 
cases involving a privity relationship or its functional equivalent, often 
also requiring that both the facts supporting the claim and the relief 
 
211 This clarification of the sources of policy on aggregate liability helps to illu-
strate one of the great costs to federalism values that the Class Action Fairness Act of 
2005 (CAFA) imposes.  By moving huge numbers of state law class actions into the fed-
eral courts—including Shady Grove itself—CAFA will deprive states of the opportunity 
to rule in the first instance on these important questions concerning the policies 
bound up in their liability and regulatory rules and the impact of aggregate relief upon 
those policies.  “These potential costs of ordinary diversity litigation are much more 
salient when state courts can, and predictably will, be stripped of the capacity to use a 
potent remedial form to implement substantive policy in a jurisdictional world that is 
no longer meaningfully concurrent.”  Burbank, supra note 23, at 1529.  It would be-
hoove the federal courts to consider employing procedures for certifying questions of 
state law to state courts more actively in such cases so that their rulings on the content 
of state law can be authoritative, rather than predictive. 
212 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 1005(a) (McKinney 1963), repealed by L.1975, ch. 207, § 2 (1975).  
Section (b) of the statute set forth provisions for protective orders and notice, and sec-
tion (c) required court approval for dismissal or settlement of a class proceeding.  See 
id. at (b), (c). 
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sought be identical among class members.213  By 1973, the New York 
Court of Appeals took the unusual step of acknowledging the need for 
reform in an opinion, explaining that “the restrictive interpretation in 
the past of [section 1005] and its predecessor statutes no longer has 
the viability it may once have had” and that those restrictive doctrines 
had produced “general and judicial dissatisfaction . . . [and] in many 
instances may mean a total lack of remedy.”214  Observing that legisla-
tion was preferable to “judicial development in the same direction” 
because “the proposed statute would assure limitations and safeguards 
which would be highly desirable,” the court gave its explicit approval 
to efforts then pending in the New York legislature to overhaul the 
provision, a change that it characterized as “urgen[t].”215 
Two years later, the efforts of the New York legislature bore fruit, 
producing two new statutory provisions.  The first, section 901(a) of 
the Civil Practice Law and Rules, sets forth basic requirements for cer-
tification of a class that are similar to those contained in the 1966 ver-
sion of Federal Rule 23.216  The second, section 901(b), then imposed 
a limitation prohibiting class treatment of any “action to recover a 
penalty, or minimum measure of recovery created or imposed by sta-
 
213 See, e.g., Onofrio v. Playboy Club of New York, Inc., 205 N.E.2d 308 (N.Y. 1965), 
adopting 244 N.Y.S.2d 485, 489-90 (N.Y. App. Div. 1963) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (disal-
lowing a class action seeking to represent 50,000 people who had paid dues for the es-
tablishment of a private club that never came into being, where some class members 
might not wish to sue or might pursue a different form of remedy); Kovarsky v. Brook-
lyn Union Gas Co., 18 N.E.2d 287, 290-91 (N.Y. 1938) (disallowing a damages class ac-
tion, but permitting a declaratory class action, in a case seeking reimbursement on be-
half of a class of similarly situated customers whom the defendant utility company 
allegedly charged illegal fees); see also ADMIN. BD. OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE 
STATE OF NEW YORK, EIGHTEENTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF 
THE STATE OF NEW YORK app. D at A35-36 (1973) (describing class actions in New York 
as generally limited “to the closely associated relationships growing out of trusts, part-
nerships, or joint ventures, and ownership of corporate stock”). 
214 Moore v. Metro. Life Ins., 307 N.E.2d 554, 558 (N.Y. 1973) (citations omitted). 
215 Id. 
216 Importantly, however, the New York provision requires that common issues 
predominate over individual issues in any class action, not just those seeking compen-
satory damages.  Compare N.Y. C.P.L.R. 901(a) (McKinney 2006) (“One or more mem-
bers of a class may sue or be sued as representative parties on behalf of all if:  1. the 
class is so numerous that joinder of all members, whether otherwise required or per-
mitted, is impracticable; 2. there are questions of law or fact common to the class 
which predominate over any questions affecting only individual members; 3. the claims 
or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the 
class; 4. the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the 
class; and 5. a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and effi-
cient adjudication of the controversy.”), with FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)–(b) (employing simi-
lar language and standards). 
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tute” unless specifically authorized by the statute itself—that is, unless 
the statute “creating or imposing a penalty, or a minimum measure of 
recovery specifically authorizes the recovery thereof in a class ac-
tion.”217  As the Court of Appeals explained in Sperry v. Crompton Corp., 
this limitation on aggregate liability in New York “was the result of a 
compromise among competing interests”218 that arose from concerns 
among prodefendant groups that the aggregation of penalties would 
lead to gross and destructive overenforcement.  “These groups feared 
that recoveries beyond actual damages could lead to excessively harsh 
results . . . . They also argued that there was no need to encourage lit-
igation by aggregating damages when statutory penalties and mini-
mum measures of recovery provided an aggrieved party with a suffi-
cient economic incentive to pursue a claim.”219  Section 901(b), the 
Court held, “[r]espond[ed] to these concerns” by eliminating the 
“‘additional encouragement’” of penalty liability in cases where it was 
“‘not necessary’” and could in fact subvert state regulatory policies.220 
In addition to these controlling statements by New York’s highest 
court, which define section 901(b) as an integral component of the 
state’s policies on penalty liability,221 the structure and operation of 
the statute also reflect its focus on New York liability law.  The law re-
quires that any “statute creating or imposing a penalty, or a minimum 
measure of recovery specifically authorize[] the recovery thereof in a 
class action” in order for aggregate liability to be available.222  In so 
doing, section 901(b) creates a point of reference—express statutory 
authorization for aggregate penalty liability—to which no other legis-
lature (state or federal) would have reason to be attentive.  Why would 
New Jersey, Montana, or the United States Congress have any occasion 
to include such an express authorization in their penalty statutes, 
since their law contains no general limitation on the availability of pe-
 
217 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 901(b). 
218 Sperry v. Crompton Corp., 863 N.E.2d 1012, 1015 (N.Y. 2007). 
219 Id. 
220 Id. (quoting Sponsor’s Mem., Bill Jacket, L.1975, ch. 207). 
221 Cf. Schultz v. Boy Scouts of Am., Inc., 480 N.E.2d 679, 683 (N.Y. 1985) (author-
itatively defining New York’s law abrogating charitable immunity as a “loss-
distribution rule” applicable only to New York residents and entities, not a conduct-
regulating provision applicable to harm carried out on New York soil, and hence in-
applicable to out-of-state litigants). 
222 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 901(b). 
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nalties on an aggregate basis?223  As Justice Ginsburg aptly observes in 
describing the policies that the statute addresses, 
The limitation was not designed with the fair conduct or efficiency of liti-
gation in mind.  Indeed, suits seeking statutory damages are arguably best 
suited to the class device because individual proof of actual damages is un-
necessary.  New York’s decision instead to block class-action proceedings 
for statutory damages therefore makes scant sense, except as a means to a 
manifestly substantive end:  Limiting a defendant’s liability in a single law-
suit in order to prevent the exorbitant inflation of penalties—remedies the 
New York Legislature created with individual suits in mind.
224
 
The New York Court of Appeals relied upon these precepts in con-
cluding that the state’s antitrust law, which was amended to include 
treble damages shortly after section 901(b) was enacted but did not 
include express authorization for a class action, must be read in light 
of section 901(b) to disallow recovery of those treble damages on an 
aggregate basis.225  The court even made clear that it would not be 
guided by federal antitrust precedents on the proper characterization 
of treble damages as a penalty vel non, since section 901(b) indicated 
that “‘State policy . . . or the legislative history’” justified “interp-
ret[ing] our statute differently.”226 
The Connecticut Supreme Court has issued a choice-of-law rul-
ing—apparently without the benefit of Sperry, which was decided four 
months earlier but is not cited in the opinion—that arrives at the 
same conclusion about the role of section 901(b) in New York’s over-
all liability scheme.  In Weber v. U.S. Sterling Securities,227 a New York res-
ident brought a putative class action in the state courts of Connecticut 
against a corporation headquartered in New York, alleging violations 
of the federal Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA).228  That 
unusual federal statute provides a penalty remedy of five hundred dol-
 
223 The opposite rule of construction applies to federal statutes, which are generally 
assumed to be enforceable through a class proceeding unless Congress clearly signals a 
contrary intent.  See Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 700 (1979) (“We do not find in 
§ 205(g) the necessary clear expression of congressional intent to exempt actions 
brought under that statute from the operation of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.”). 
224 Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431, 1465 
(2010) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
225 See Sperry v. Crompton Corp., 863 N.E.2d 1012, 1015-17 (N.Y. 2007). 
226 Id. at 1018 (quoting Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Abrams, 520 N.E.2d 535, 539 (N.Y. 
1988)).  The omitted text includes “‘differences in the statutory language’” as a basis 
for divergences of interpretation between the state and federal antitrust laws, id., a fac-
tor that was not pertinent to the question with which the court was grappling. 
227 924 A.2d 816 (Conn. 2007). 
228 47 U.S.C. § 227 (2006). 
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lars (with the possibility of treble damages) for every unsolicited fax 
that a defendant sends to an unwilling recipient, but only when the 
cause of action is “otherwise permitted by the laws or rules of court of 
a State.”229  The Connecticut Supreme Court interpreted the TCPA to 
require a determination as to whether the applicable “state substantive 
law” recognizes the action, and it concluded that Connecticut choice-
of-law rules called for the application of New York tort law.230  Section 
901(b), the court concluded, was a part of that liability regime: 
“While there is no precise definition of either [substantive or procedural 
law], it is generally agreed that a substantive law creates, defines and re-
gulates rights while a procedural law prescribes the methods of enforc-
ing such rights or obtaining redress.”  It is clear that § 901(b) is substan-
tive because it abridges the rights of individuals to bring class action 
claims in New York state.  We have determined that statutes, like 
§ 901(b), that affect an individual’s cause of action clearly are substan-
tive in nature.
231
 
The Connecticut Supreme Court’s reasoning is not as precise here as 
one might like, but its conclusion is sound:  section 901(b) defines the 
scope of penalty liability under New York law, not merely the mechan-
isms available to enforce an aggregate proceeding. 
Because the New York legislature chose to effectuate this shift in 
liability policy “in wholesale, rather than retail, fashion,” as Justice 
Ginsburg puts it232—i.e., through a single provision of the Civil Prac-
tice Law and Rules that iterates throughout all New York law,233 rather 
 
229 Id. § (b)(3). 
230 Weber, 924 A.2d at 825-28. 
231 Id. at 827 (quoting D’Eramo v. Smith, 872 A.2d 408, 416 (Conn. 2005)).  This 
ruling drew in part on a string of cases deciding the related but distinct issue of wheth-
er section 901(b) controls in actions brought under the TCPA in federal court.  Every 
district court to confront that question appears to have answered in the affirmative.  See 
Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431, 1465 & n.4 (2010) 
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (discussing the treatment of section 901(b) in TCPA litiga-
tion and collecting authorities). 
232 Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1466. 
233 We have noted the irony arising from reliance on New York sources in explana-
tions of the limitations on court rulemaking in predecessor bills to the Enabling Act.  See 
supra note 55.  To the extent that New York’s mode of allocating lawmaking responsibil-
ity and organizing statutory law contributed to Justice Scalia’s confusion, he would have 
benefited from reading a published speech that the Chair of the original Advisory 
Committee gave to the New York State Bar Association in 1938.  Having quoted the 
second sentence of the Enabling Act, William D. Mitchell observed that “[t]he present 
New York Civil Practice Act contains some chapters, such as the statute of limitations, 
which obviously do not belong in rules of procedure, but in addition to that, many of 
the procedural sections are interspersed with provisions affecting substantive rights.”  
William D. Mitchell, Reform in Judicial Procedure, 24 A.B.A. J. 197, 199 (1938). 
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than amendments to the same effect in each New York statute pre-
scribing minimum damages or a penalty—the question does arise 
whether the courts of New York would also apply section 901(b) in a 
multistate case governed by the law of another jurisdiction.  The bet-
ter answer is that they should not.  As noted above, other jurisdictions 
would have no reason to include an express authorization for class-
wide liability in their penalty statutes, and it would create a mismatch 
that might well improperly foreclose aggregate relief if a New York 
court applied the disqualification of section 901(b) to out-of-state 
causes of action.234  But the courts of New York could come to a differ-
ent conclusion without undermining what is set forth above.235 
Following Shady Grove, one might well ask how a state should pro-
ceed when it wishes to protect its industries from the possibility of 
crushing aggregate penalties while still providing remedies that will 
induce individual enforcement.  One solution may be to insert cum-
bersome amendments into each and every penalty statute in the state 
code that make clear that aggregate liability is unavailable.  The ma-
jority opinion, however, leaves some doubt as to whether even that 
step would be sufficient to withstand the overwhelming force that it 
ascribes to Rule 23’s language that a class action “may be maintained” 
 
234 Thus, insofar as courts have found that section 901(b) prohibits recovery un-
der the TCPA, we should understand that result to rest upon an assessment of the 
limits of classwide penalty liability under New York law, rather than the failure of the 
TCPA to include its own express authorization for classwide relief—a subtle but im-
portant distinction. 
235 The New York legislature could decide—or have imputed to it the decision—
that it will employ a precautionary principle in classwide out-of-state penalty actions, 
declining to make the courts of New York available for their enforcement unless the 
relevant legislature, like the New York legislature, has explicitly provided that classwide 
penalty liability is permissible.  Given the potential for the class action to magnify pe-
nalty liability to a crippling degree, see Richard A. Nagareda, Aggregation and Its Discon-
tents:  Class Settlement Pressure, Classwide Arbitration, and CAFA, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1872, 
1882-88 (2006) (discussing the potential distortions of liability policy the class action 
introduces in penalty cases under the label “the addition effect”), such a precautionary 
principle would not be irrational or improper, provided that it operated as a forum 
non conveniens doctrine and did not purport to entail preclusive consequences.  Cf. 
Loucks v. Standard Oil Co. of New York, 120 N.E. 198, 200-02 (N.Y. 1918) (Cardozo, J.) 
(framing the public-policy exception in choice of law as a matter of “declining jurisdic-
tion” over a transitory cause of action that could still be enforced elsewhere).  The New 
York Civil Practice Law and Rules does sometimes employ devices that do this kind of 
double duty, as the Supreme Court of the United States has recognized.  See Gasperini 
v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 418, 426 (1996) (noting that section 5501(c) 
of the New York Civil Practice Law and Rules, which allows state appeals courts “to re-
view the size of jury verdicts,” is both “substantive” and “procedural”).  Still, there is no 
evidence of which we are aware that the New York legislature had such a dual purpose 
in mind in this instance. 
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if the prerequisites of the Rule are satisfied.236  As Justice Ginsburg ob-
served, the majority opinion might be read to suggest that a statute 
prescribing that “no more than $1,000,000 may be recovered in a class 
action” might be both sufficient and necessary to achieve this goal, 
since it is formally presented as a cap on damages, rather than a state-
ment about what class actions “may be maintained.”237  If so, then Shady 
Grove will stand as a monument to the collateral damage that results 
when single-minded formalism crowds out sensible pragmatism.238 
CONCLUSION 
There is no reason to believe that the drafters and promulgators 
of the 1966 revisions to Rule 23 anticipated the potentially destructive 
relationship between the damages class action and the creation of sta-
tutory penalties.  The New York legislature had the benefit of almost 
ten years of practice under the newly unleashed power of the Federal 
Rule 23(b)(3) class action when they decided to circumscribe New 
York’s statutory scheme of penalty and statutory-damages liability as a 
condition of adopting that tool in their own courts.239  Having opted 
to pursue class action reform on a transsubstantive basis, but armed 
with knowledge of its dangers, the New York legislature enacted an 
 
236 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b); see also Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 464-65, 468 n.12 (Scalia, J., 
dissenting) (valorizing the formal distinction between a “rule of law” and a “rule of re-
view” in arguing that Rule 59 should displace the underlying law in determining when 
a jury award is excessive). 
237 Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1466-67 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
238 See also Wolff, supra note 203 (discussing the perverse impact that misplaced 
textualism had upon the law of original federal jurisdiction in City of Chicago v. Interna-
tioal College of Surgeons, 522 U.S. 156 (1997)). 
239 Writing in the same year that the New York legislature enacted section 901(b), 
Professor Cover noted that truth-in-lending cases were “the single significant excep-
tion” to the failure of federal courts to “analyze[] class action cases as presenting prob-
lematic questions of substantive law.”  Cover, supra note 147, at 734.  Moreover, having 
suggested as a cause the fact that “the $100 minimum recovery per violation can be 
and has been read as inconsistent with the multiplier effect of 23(b)(3) class actions,” 
Cover referred to “the significant opinions of Judge Marvin Frankel in Ratner v. Chem-
ical Bank N.Y. Trust Co., 54 F.R.D. 412 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).”  Id. at 734 n.43.  In that case, 
Judge Frankel denied certification, concluding that “allowance of this as a class action 
is essentially inconsistent with the specific remedy supplied by Congress and employed 
by plaintiff in this case.”  Ratner, 54 F.R.D. at 416.  It is no surprise that Ratner was in-
voked by those seeking to bar the use of class actions to recover penalties in New York.  
See Memorandum from Sanford H. Bolz, Gen. Counsel, Empire State Chamber of 
Commerce (Feb. 14, 1975) (on file with authors) (“Penalties and class actions simply 
do not mix.  This was proved in Ratner v. Chemical Bank, a case under the Federal 
Rules, where the combination caused a potential liability of $130,000,000 although the 
actual damages to individual plaintiffs were zero!”). 
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equilibrating provision that sought to prevent harm in categories of 
cases where it could be anticipated.  We should neither expect pres-
cience from the drafters of the Federal Rules nor adopt an interpre-
tive methodology that treats open-ended text like a fractal that some-
how already contains endless levels of determinate meaning when 
unanticipated problems first arise.240  Rather, we should build upon 
the insight of Professor Cover, which sadly has lain largely dormant 
since he first offered it: 
[T]here is a way of reading the Enabling Act which neither renders it a 
dead letter, as courts have tended to do, nor construes it as a bulwark 
against change.  Such a reading would start with the premise . . . that 
absent a trans-substantive structure of rules, courts must often justify 
decisions about procedure with a combination of substantive and pro-
cedural objectives and values.  The Rules Enabling Act might then be 
read to mean that the courts, in applying the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure or any subsequently enacted similar body of rules, may not for-
sake their responsibility to justify substantive impact in terms of substan-
tive values.  It would not be enough to point to Rule 23; one would have 
to justify invoking it.
241
 
Cover’s wise counsel applies with equal force in cases where trans-
substantive rules cannot meaningfully be said to embody any prospec-
tive choice at all concerning the situations to which they must be ap-
plied.  This interpretive dilemma might occur when a new adjudicatory 
problem arises that was entirely unforeseen by the rule drafters, or 
when the realities of litigation and civil law enforcement have evolved to 
such an extent that our understanding of what it means to have legal 
rights must necessarily change.  In such cases, the Federal Rules require 
a more nuanced form of analysis than has previously been applied—
one that (i) recognizes the capacity of the Federal Rules to catalyze in-
novation in liability policy, (ii) acknowledges the proper role of the ju-
diciary in developing interstitial procedures when the Rules mark out a 
terrain without providing clear guideposts, and nonetheless (iii) always 
keeps clearly in sight the source of the underlying substantive law and 
the limits that Erie and the federal common law process impose on the 
federal courts in departing from its controlling precepts. 
Justice Ginsburg noted the irony of the Shady Grove decision, con-
sidering that it came in a case where federal subject matter jurisdic-
 
240 “I think [Professor Moore] will agree that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 
themselves, ought never to become the categories to which substance must bend.”  
Cover, supra note 147, at 740. 
241 Id. at 734-35. 
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tion depended upon the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (CAFA).242  
After all, many of CAFA’s proponents sought to curb perceived over-
enforcement of state law by expanding federal diversity jurisdiction to 
include virtually all economically significant class actions, which an in-
creasingly conservative Rule 23 jurisprudence could then govern.243  
Despite CAFA’s underlying jurisdictional commitment to combating 
perverse overenforcement of state liability, Shady Grove subverted New 
York’s shield against the overenforcement of state law penalties or 
minimum damages.  But that irony should not obscure the underlying 
similarity between CAFA and Shady Grove.  Both developments have 
deprived the states of power to pursue visions of the class action that 
differ from the federal vision.  CAFA was a product of the democratic 
process, however protracted and messy.  Shady Grove was not.  We are 
thus reminded once again of the Supreme Court’s powerful incentive 
to impute the Enabling Act’s limitations to the false idol of federalism 
values, rather than giving effect to the Act’s purpose as a guardian of 
the separation of powers.  Only the latter approach offers the promise 
of consistent and faithful attention to the intended limits on the 
Court’s rulemaking authority. 
 
242 See Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1473 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (noting that the Class 
Action Fairness Act of 2005 was intended to decrease the number of class actions overall). 
243 See Burbank, supra note 23, at 1441-47, 1507-09. 
